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tures,  some  of them redirected  from CMEA  markets,  primarily
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Empirical  ,tudies have paid little attention to the  economic chaos and vacillating macroeconomic
supply-side forces behind the export perfor-  reforn,  registered drops in both exports and
mance of the Central and Eastern European  imports.
countries of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
Poland, and Romania (CEE-5) in OECD markets  Kaminski suggests that differences among
after the collapse of central planning.  Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland (CEE-3)
had little to do with previous trends in export
Kaminski examines export developments in  performance, extemal economic factors, and
these countries in 1980-91, focusing on how  earlier attempts at trade reform. The expansion
transformation programs affected trade. QECD  of exports in 1990-92 represented a dramatic
markets now receive three-fourths of CEE-5  reversal of trends prevalent in the prior two
exports. Sustaining this market penetration is  decades. The surge in exports is explained
cru.al  for countries making the transition to  neither by the length of time experimenting with
market-based economies. Kaminski provides  foreign trade under central planning nor by
insight into the impact of wansformation-cum-  earlier trends in competitiveness in OECD
stabilization programs on export performance.  markets.
These insights are relevant to former centrally
planned economies that have yet to restore  The driving force of export growth was
macroeconomic equilibrium and to liberalize  manufactures, some of them redirected from
prices.  CMEA markets, primarily to Germany. The
severing of links that used to bind the economies
Kaminski examines the export performance  of the CIMEA  had a less destructive impact on
of the CEE-5 before and after the collapse of  the foreign trade performance of the CEE-3 than
central planning. He fmds a close link-between  one might have expected.
export performance and the decision to move
quickly to a market-based economy. Countries  The fact tha  exports to the CMEA fell at the
that removed administrative controls on prices,  same time that exports elsewhere (often of the
devalued currency, introduced unified exchange  same products) increased suggests a causal
rates, and liberalized trade also expanded ex-  relationship.
ports. Bulgaria and Romania, crippled by macro-
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Assessing  the export  impace  of the transformation  of the post-communist  countries  is difficult. For
the CEE-5 (Central European Economies:  Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,  Hungary, Poland, and Romania)
attributing  change  in export  performance  to a change  in a particular  policy  variable  is extremely  complicated.
First, all variables  have been  in a state of flux; next, in some  casws  too short a time bas elapsed  to make  any
generalizations;  and finally, the quality  of trade  data is poor as national  s4tistical  offices  have  not kept pace
with the expansion  of the private sector and the move  to a new customs  system. Predicting  the economie
responses  to a stabilization  package  in "socialist  economies  in traasition"  is a problem,  too, since  more than
90 percent  of industrial  output  came from  the state-owned  sector,  and organizational  structures  were  designed
to facilitate  administrative  management  by the state rather than  to respond  to market signals.
In addition to its organizational  legacies, central planning  also left a legacy of production  and
investmeut  patterns  heavily  distorted  by the misallocation  of resources. Development  strategies  wt-re  inward-
oriented, with one exception-investment  decisions  in the smaller CPEs (centrally  planned  economies)  were
largely  directed  by the import requirements  of the FSU (the former  Soviet  Union). The mismatch  between
the  CPEs' production  structure  and demand  in international  markets  resulted  in their declining  competitiveness
in markets  for manufactures.  Consequently,  although  transformation  programs  may  bring  about  thc  necessary
changes  in incentives  and make enterprises  responsive  w external  business  opportunities,  Cheir  capacity  to
ccmpete internationally  will be limited for some time because of outdated technologies. It is puzzling,
therefore,  to consider  why  manufactures  were the  driving  force  behind  the export  expansion  to OECD  markets
from countries  which implemented  radical  transformation  programs.
The disintegration  of the CMEA  (Council  for Mutual  Economic  Assistance')  inflicted  a severe  shock
on all CMEA  member  economies,  including  the  FSU which  "..was  hurt more  than it gained"  (ECE  1992:104).
The sudden switch from the soft transferable  ruble (fR)  to the hard currency settlement  mechanism,
accompanied  by the  fall in Soviet  oil output,  changed  dramatically  the  external  position  of the former  CMEA
economies. Sectors  that had been developed  to serve the intra-CMEA  division  of labor  have faced a major
contraction  in demand  for their products. These  sectors, together  with those established  for political  rather
thac economic  reasons, accounted  for a considerable  portion  of the industrial  output  of the former CMEA
region. This  paper  addresses  the question  of the extent  to which  the contraction  in intra-CMEA  trade resulted
in the switching  o-  exports  from the CMEA  toward the OECD.
The size  of the export  sector  in overall  economic  activity  has significantly  increased  in only  the three
most reformed  countries (CEE-3)--the  FCSK (the former Czechoslovakia),  Hungary and Poland.  This
I The  CMEA  was  officially  dissolved  at its 46th  general  meeting  on June  28, 1991. Its memb  .B included
Bulgaria,  Cuba, Czechoslovakia,  German  Democratic  Republic,  Hungary,  Mongolia,  Poland,  Romania,  Soviet
Union  and Vietnam.2
increased  share has been due to both the continued  contraction  of GDP (and an even larger contraction  in
industrial  output)  and the expansion  of exports  to the OECD. Available  evidence  suggests  that the export
expansi,a in OECD markets  was to some extent propeLled  by redirection  of sales from the CMEA.  The
decline  in the value of intra-CMEA  exports was in absolute  terms equal to the increase in exports to the
OECD,  especially  in the case of the most reformed  CEE-3  economies.
The sustainability  of the change in the trade pattem is unsure.  For the short term, the export
expansion  appears  to be sustainable--the  drop in domestic  demand,  the improved  acuess  to OECD  markets,
the liberalization  of foreign  trade regimes,  and the move  toward  convertibility  of domestic  currencies  have
provided  a strong stimulus  to firms -i look for external  markets  for their products. Medium-  to long-term
prospects, however, remain uncertain. The fall in investment  and industrial  output so far has not been
reversed--  not one country  in Central Europe  has shown  signs  of recovery,  with the possible  exception  of
Hungary  and Poland  in 1992. With the general  contracticn  in investment  a-id  the cor-tinued  ambivalence  in
the situation  of SOEs (state-owned  enterprises),  there is a danger  that even so-far  successful  export-oriented
SOEs  may refrain  from investments.  Further constraints  to investment  include  the poorly developed  banking
sector,  the lack of iustitutional  infrastructure  supporting  foreign  trade, and ambiguities  in property  rights  and
in the organizational  status  of many  SOEs. Moreover,  the shift of resources  to the ex  sector  may be less
than it would be with profit-oriented  firms. 2 If SOEs use export proceeds  to increase  wages rather than
profits, a likely development  in labor-managed  SOEs, their future  competitiveness  may be jeopardized. In
the longer  run, a sustained  export  performance  and integration  with the  world economy  will  depend  on many
factors including macroeconomic  policies, exchange  rate policy, foreign direct investment  inflows antd
domestic  savings,  as well as on the development  of an institutional  environment  enhancing  microeconomic
efficiency.
This paper addresses  the question  of the impact  of the marke:  transition  on the export  performance
of Central Eumpean  economies  by taking  a broad look at developments  both in the foreign  trade regimes  of
the CEE-5  and their export  performance  in OECD  markets. It begins by assessing  where these economies
are in terms of institutional  change  in their foreign  trade regimes. It then provides  an overview  of export
performance  of the CEE-S  in OECD  markets  in the 1980-91  period,  specifically  addressing  the issue of the
impact  of moving  to a market  economy. It shows  that  an increase  in penetration  of OECD  market  vas  driven
by the change  in domestic  economic  systems  rather than by external  factors such as the breakdown  of the
CMEA or the emergence  of cooperative  economic  relations  between  the CEE-5 and OECD economies.
Following  the collapse  of central  planning,  OECD  governments  introduced  measures  improving  market  access
2  Without  e  4etailed  analys'  - capital  investments  disaggregated  to the level  of firms,  it is impossible
to assess  the extent  to wzmich  the strue.,  of exports  keeps  on being  regenerated.3
for the CEE-5. It is argued, however,  that OSP (General  System  of Preferences)  status granted  by the EC
to Hungary  and Poland (effective  in 1990),  increased  EC quotas for textiles  and clothing  or MFN status in
the United  States  do not provide  a fuil explanation  of the increase  in exports. The export  performance  of the
Central European "troika'--the FCSK, Hungar, dnd Polard--was  particularly  impressive  in the 1990-91
period,  when  a long-term  trend of progressive  mnaginalization  in OECD  markets,  especially  for manufactured
goods,  was reversed. Is this the  beginning  of a new  trend  to expanding  integration  with the world  economy;
This question  is addressed  only tangentially;  more  research  is needed  on the anatomy  of the export  upswing
following  the collapse  of central  planning.
II. LIMITS  TO CHANGES  IN FOREIGN  TRADE  REGIMES  UNDER CENTRAL  fLANNING
The reform of foreign trade regimes began well before thc collapse of the CEE-5 communist
governments  in 1989  and 1990. In fact, foreign  trade was an area where much policy  experimentation  had
taken place in the 1980s. The general  approach  taken bv communist  reformers  included  linking  domestic
prices  to international  prices; estab)lishing  direct  links  between  ent*erprises  and international  markets,  bypassing
the traditional  foreign  trade organizations;  establishing  a larger  number  o! intermediaries  with  a less  restricted
trading  profile; .M.*ducing  currency  auctioaIs;  and reducing  the number  of exchange  rates  and devaluing  them
to more  realstic levels. While  these  mear: es contributed  to a proliferation  of marketing  expertise  at the level
of enterprises  and provided  incentives  to boost  exports,  they failed  to introduce  "... market  clearing  at single
prices without  ex  p( i and ad hoc subsidies  and levies,  yielding  a profit  which  is retained  by enterprises  or losses
which  penalize  them'(Nuti  1991:50).
Thus, no matter  how radical  the reform  measures  were, foreign  trade regimes  under  central  planning
remained  a source  of enormous  distort.Jns  and inefficiencies,  insulating  domestic  producers  from  the impact  of
changes  in relative  prices  in world  markets  and falling  short  of making  foreign  trade  an effective  conveyor  of
international  efficiency  standards.  What  was  needed  to achieve  this  end was:  the  removal  of anti-export  biases  such
as import  restrictions,  administrative  allocation  of raw materials  and foreign  exchange,  and price controls;  the
dismantling  of administrative  mechanisms  designed  to encourage  exports  and  discourag-  imports;  and  the  elimination
of 'soft-budgets'  for enterprises  (so that  inefficient  producers  would  be penalized).  However,  these  changes  were
not possible  without  abandoning  central  planning.
Before  the  collapse  of communism,  the decentraLzation  of foreign  trade  regimes  made  most  progress  in
Hungary  and Poland-they  were  both  highly  indebted  to the  West  and were  the  first  to seek  to orient  their  economies
away  from  the  CMEA  (Hillman  and  Schnytzer,  1992:253).  With  the  decline  of the  Soviet  capability  to sustain  intra-
CMEA  trade in the late 1980s,  other CEE-5  countries  undertook  foreign  trade reforms  but these were less
comprehensive  than  those  of Hungary  and Poland. Foreign uade  reforms  shared  two  sets of featres.  The  first4
set included  allowing  SOEs  to conduct  foreign  trade, thus  eroding  the state  monopoly  cf foreign  trade. For instance,
in 1986 the Hungarian government  adopted  the principle  of 'parallel' tra,.  licenses. Trade licenses  were no longer
granted exclusively  to domimant  exporters  and importers. They  were made available  to all firms and covered most
products.  As a result, the number  of firms operating  in internatioral markets  dramatically  increased  by the end of
the 1980s. 3 In Polamd,  significant  steps to dismantle  the state monopoly  of foreign trade were undertaken  in the
early 1980s  when the authorities liberal;  zed conditions  to obtain  foreign  trade licenses.  Between 1982  and 1985,  the
number of SOEs empowered to conduct foreign  trade opemtion- it4reased from 109 to 361.  By the end of the
1980s,  the smate  monopoly  was abrogated  (Olechowski  and Oles, 1991:156  and 158).
The second  set of features  of foreign  trade  reforms included  creating  :ncentives  for SOEs to expand  exports
through hard currency retention schemes  and exchange  rate policy.  The latter consisted  essentially  of a series of
devaluations  towards more realistic rates.  Between  1980 and 1985, the Polish real exchange  rate depreciated  by
30 percent, and the Hungarian  rate by 11 percent (Roe and Roy, 1989:6). The exchange  rate policy had a more
significant  impact  on export pcformance once SOEs  were allowed  to retain some portion  of their foreign  exchange
earnings. Polish  exporters who were allowed  to retain 25-30  percent of their foreign  exchanve  earnings  responded
to a substantial  devaluation of the Polish zloty in late 1987 by increasing  sxports-the  17.4 percent increase in
convertible  currency exports in 1988 was attributable to the devaluation (Winiecki, 1991).  Retention schemes
amounted  to limited convertibility. In Hungary  - 2)89 import liberalization  package  comprising  about 35 percent
(subsequently  extended  in 1990 to include  65-70  percent)  of Hungary's hard-crrency imports,  combined  withjoint-
ventures laws allowing  profit repatriation  abroad, introduced  a limited  convertibility  to Hungarian currency.
While these cnanges in the foreign  trade regimes  reduced the insulation  of enterprises  from iuternatioral
markets, almost full protection of SCEs from international  competition  was retained. 4 Not even in Hungary  or
Poland  did the trade regime  offer any clue as to whether  domestically-profitable  operasions  had  a positive  or negative
value  added at world  prices. Nonetheiess,  as we shall see, the export performan(*e  of Hungary  and Poland  in OECD
markets was significantly  better than that of other CEE-5 economies, suggesting  the existence  of a positive link
between  foreign trade reforms and export performance.
In other CEE-5 countries,  with the exception  of Romania, there was also a lot of activity in foreigL  trade
policy  but little that  was effective. The currency  was devalued  in the FCSK  (by 19 percent in 1989)  and in Bulgaria
(by a factor of 12 in 1989!).  Bulgarian  exporters were allowed to retain 60 percent of their export earnings.
Auctions  of foreign  currency  were organized  in Bulgaria  and the FCSK. These measures  had a more limited  impact
on foreign trade than similar measures in Hungary and Poland for o'ie major reason:  SOEs in Bulgaria  and the
3  For a review, see Mizsei (1991:15-20).
4  For a brief discussion  of the Polish foreign trade regime in the late 1980s, see World Bank, Poland:
Economic  Mmnagement  for A New Era (1990).5
FCSK  wem much more adminiive  units of the state than their coun  parts in Hungary  and Poland. Even so,
SOEs in all CEE-5 economics  operated  in an administrative  environment  devoid of competition, market clearing
prices, freedom of entry, and a final penalty fa: poor performance, i.e.,  bankruptcy.  For all,  foreign trade
equalization  schemes provided  a buffer between  domestic  producers and world prices.
The major lesson that  can be drawn from these  attempted  reforms of fcreign trade regimes under central
plarning is that their impact on export performance  and competitiveness  was limited while an administrative
economic  system  remained. With  the colLpse of the communist  regimes  it became  politically  possible to dismantle
cntral  planning  (or whatever was left of it) and establish  an economic  system based  on market-clearing  prices and
competition  among autonomous  economic  units. However, the results of the collapse of communism  varied with
the pace of 'system replacement"  pursued  in different  CEE-5  countries. Hungary  followed  a 'shock minimization'
approach, Poland and the FCSK adopted radical programs in  January 1990 and 1991 respectively, and two
latecomers, Bulgaria and Romania,  began introducing  reform measures throughout 1991 and early 1992.  As we
shaU  see, the (Ufferent  paces reflected  to some degree earlier expressed attitudes towards  reform.
1a. CEE-S  EXPORTS  TO THE OECD IN THE 1980s: THE INITJAL  BREAKDOW'N  AND GROWING
MARGINAUZATION
This section provides background  for the assessment  of export perforn_...  of the CEE-5 economies
following  the collapse  of communism. Since the objective  is to identify major trends in their  ompetitive  position
between  1980  and 1989, aud to assess  the degree to which  their export  performance  in 1990-91  represented  a break
with the past, the analysis in this section is limited to the following  broad commodity  categories:  foods and feeds
(..ITC Rev.2. 0+1+22+4);  raw materials (SITC Rev.2. 2-22-27-28);  mineral fuels (SlTC Rev.2. 3); ores and
metals  (SlTC Rev.2. 27+28+68);  and manufactures  (SITC. Rev. 2. 5+6+7+8-68).  In order to minimize  well-
known problems conceniing the qua,ity or statistical  information  from this region, the analysis of CEE-¶ expore
performance  in OECD markets is based on import data of OECD countries. The analysis covers European and
North American  OECD members  and Japan.'
A.  An Overviow  of Major Tendencies  in Exort  Performance
No matter how vigorously  the various communist  governments  pursued reform policies the foreign  trade
performance  of individual  countries  revealed disturbing  similarities. First, despite govemments' efforts to reverse
declining  competitiveness  evident  in the 1970s  (Pozmaski, 1988), the competitive  position  of all CEE-5  countris
in OECD markets dropped significantly  further in the 1980s.  The competitive  position  of all CEE-5 economies,
5 The analysis does not cover all OECD  members. It includes  ten members of the European Communities
(i.e.,  excluding Greece and Portugal),  all members  of the European Free Trade Association  (Austria, Finland,
Iceland, Norway, Sweden  and Switzerland),  North America  (USA and Canada), and Japan.6
as measured  by annual  changes  in their shares  in total  imports  of OECD  countries,  fell each year in the 1980s
excopt  in 1984.6  Their  averaga  annual  export  growth  rate  was  2.9 percent  while  the  average  for all  OECD  imports
was  5.6 pement  in 1981-89.  As can  be seen  from  Table  1, the  CaE-S  share  in total  OECD  imports  fell  from 1.1
percent  in 1980  to 0.9 percent  in 1989:  In 1989  the region's  tolal xp"rts to the  CECD  stood  at three  quarters  of
their 1980  level.
Table  :  Shiare  of CEE-5  in Totat lIports  of OCE, by Major Pros.ct  Categories, 1980-89
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  190  1991
Foods  and  Feeds  1.5  1.3  1.3  1.3  1.3  1.4  1.4  1.4  1.4  1.6  1.6  1.6
mlnerat  Fuels  1.0  0.8  0.8  1.0  1.3  1.3  1.6  1.6  1.5  1.3  0.9  0.8
Ores  & Nonferrous  Motals  1.4  1.2  1.3  1.1  1.4  1.4  1.3  1.3  1.4  1.2  1.3  i.7
Raw  Materials  1.8  1.7  ;.7  1.7  1.7  1.8  1.9  1.7  1.6  1.4  1.5  1.5
Manufactures  1.1  1.0  0.9  0.8  0.8  0.8  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.8  0.9
Total  lports  1.15  0.99  0.95  0.95  1.02  0.98  0.95  0.94  0.90  0.88  0.91  1.8c
Source: Derived  from the United Nations CONTRADE  data base.
The shares  of Bulgaria,  the FCSK  and Poland  in total OECD  imports  reached  their  peak  in 190, and
Roma¢  peak was in 1984 (at the height of Ceaucescu's  policy of paying  off the external debt, which
eventually  destroyed  the Romanian  economy).  lungary,  which  revived  its reform  effort  afterjoining  the  12u
and the World Bank  in 1982, failed  to noticeably  improve  its competitve  position  between  1980  and 1989.
The two Balkan  countries  experienced  the largest  deterioration  in export  performance  in the 1980s:  in 1989
Bulgaria's  share stood at 57.3 percent and Romania's  at 58.8 percent  of their respective  peak performance
years. A smaller  loss of OECD  market  share was experienced  by the FCSK,  whose  share in 1939  was 80.5
percent  of its 1980  level, and Poland, whose  1989  share was 69.6 percent  of its 1980 level.'
The second disturbing  trend for the CEE-5  economies  was the growing  marginalization  of CEE-5
suppliers  in OECD  markets  in the 1980s. This  was manifest  not only in falling  shares in OECD  imports  but
also in large  annual  fluctuations  in their  exports,  revealing  their  high  vulnerability  to swings  in OECD  business
cycles,  especially  during periods  of recession. The cyclical  contraction  in OECD  import  demand  for CEE-5
products tended to be larger than for exports from other countries  with two notable exceptions:  ores and
nonferrous  metals  and mineral  fuels. The considerable  annr  - fluctuations  in CEE-5  exports to the OECD  in
the 1980s  also testified  to their lack  of long-term  commercial  contact. The range  of variation  was smaUler  for
6 This  temporary  improvement  was  mainly  due  to a one-time  increase  in Romanian  exports  across  aU  major
product  categories.  However,  subsequent  years  witnessed  a dramatic  contraction  in Romanan  exports.
7  Some  countries  fared  slightly  better  in EC markets:  the decline  in the EC import  share  of Czecho-
Slovakia,  Poland  and Romania  was lower  than  for other  OECD  markets.7
exports  to the EC than to other  OECD  parrners,  although  the latter's  share in CEE-5  exports increased  in the
1980s.'
Lhe third cause  of concern  for the CEE-5  was that the region's  comparative  advantage  rtnmained  in
food and natural resource-intensive  products, as revealed  iu its exports to OECD markets (see Table 3).
Further, its position  as a marginal  supplier of resource-intensive  products became  increasingly  apparent
throughout  the  1980s,  reflecting  the rapidly  expanding  technological  gap between  East  and West. The  region's
competitive  position iriproved in mineral fuels only.  In other markets, the CEE-5 lost shares to more
cowpetiuve  suppliers. Although  the average  rate of growth  of shares  of the CEE-5  in OECD  imports  of ores
and nonferrous  metals  and raw materials  fell in the 1981-89  period,  the contraction  was smaller  than in total
imports,  revealing  these  countries'  continued  specialization  in low  value-added,  resource-intemsive  production.
The key points evident  from the data in Table 2 are that while  CEE-S  exports to the OECD  grewv
acoss most commodity  groups,  their shares  of OECD  markets  tended  to decline,  and that this fal in market
snare was greatest  in manufactures  (in 1V89,  manufactures'  share was 62.6  percent  of its peak  level in 1980).
Hungary's  distinctive  decline  in manufactures'  exports  to the OECD  was part of a gene !' shift away from
manufactures  in both OECD  market shares  and export  revenue  composition.
Other  interesting  points  to en.  .from Table  2 are the  growing  importance  of agricultural  products
in the export  revenues  of the FCSK  and Poland,  of raw materials  in the export  revenues  of Bulgaria,  and of
ores and nonferrous  metals for Romsana. Also notable  is the fact that Pola-d's and Bulgaria's shares of
OECD  markets  for ores and nonferrous ietals  displayed  a negative  trend throughout  the 1980s.
Tabte 2:  Growth Rates  of  (A) CEE-5  Exports  to  the ECD,  by  comodity rop  Wd (B)  Chanes in  Share
of  CEE-5  Exports in  OECO  Imports,  by commodity  grops  (1981-1989, percent)
CEE-5  Bulcaria Czechoslovakia  Hungary  Poland  Romania
(A)  t8)  (A)  (9)  (A)  CB)  (A)  CB)  (A)  (B)  (A)  (C)
Foods and  Feeds  2.1 -0.5  2.6 -2.2  4.8  3.8 -0.2  1.2  4.5  2.7  -5.8  -8.6
"ineral  Fuels  -3.9  4,8  -4.1  1.3  -5.1  3.5  3.4  8.9  -3.5  5.7  -1.5  8.0
Orea&Nonferrous  Metals  0.4 -0.5  1.3 -4.9  3.5  2.9  2.8  4.9  -1.7 -3.4  17.4  15.6
Raw  Materials  6.2 -1.5  10.3  4.2  -1.4 -2.0  1.8  3.6  -2.9 -5.3  -5.8 -11.2
Manufactures  1.4 -5.0  1.0 -8.3  0.8 -5.0 -0.1  -3.3  2.4 -4.8  2.5  -5.8
Source:  See  Table  1.
s ]EC-10's  share  fell  from  around  70  percent  in the 1980-83  period  to an average  of 68  percent  in the 1984-
89 period. The  share  of EC-10  increased  slightly  for only  two  countries  between  the  two  periods:  Czechoslovakia
(from  67.2 percent  to 68.4  perceut)  and  Poland  (from  68.5  percent  to 70.3  percet).  These  increases  were  too  small
to offset  the  reorientation  of Hungary's  exports  (from  68.3  percent  to 63 percent)  and Romia's  exports  (from  72
percent  to 68 percent)  (Calculated  from  the UN COMTRADE  data  base).8
The decline  was  particularly  surprising  in the case  of the Central  European  troika. 9 The FCSK,  once
a  renowned exporter of machino  tools and other high quality industrial products, became increasingly
specialized  in agricultural  products  and ores and nonferrous  metals. Poland,  thanks  to Western  credits, had
a relatively  modern  industrial  base on the eve of the 1980s,  but experienced  the second largest  loss among
the CEE-5  in share of OECD  markets  for manufactured  products. Hence  its investment  drive in the 1970s
had no discernible  impact  on its international  competitive  position. Hungary,  a country  much  praised  for its
reform  efforts  in the 1980s,  tended  to shift away from manufactures  and food products  to minerals  and raw
materials,  although  its relative  competitive  position  feli the least among  the CEE-5  in the 1981-89  period.
B.  Two Distinct  Phases:  Breakdown  and Precarious  Recovery
An examination  of the CEE-5  OECD  export  performance  in the 1980s  suggests  the existence  of two
distinct  periods. The first, between  1980  and 1983, can be called a "breakdown"  period; the contraction  in
OECD  import  demand  resulted  in a much larger  fall in exports  from  the CEF-5. The second,  between  1984
and 1989, can be described  as a period  of stagnation  and "progressive  marginalization"  of the CEE-5  region
in OECD markets. Despite  the expanding  import  demand  in OECD  countries,  especially  for manufactured
products,  communist  governments'  efforts to boost exports  produced -Ited results.
The  first period  coincided  with  OECD  recession  and with  deterioration  in East-West  political  relations.
Total OECD  imports  fell at an annual  average  rate of around  4 percent  in the 1981-84  period, reaching  their
lowest point in 1982  when they fell by 6.2 percent. However,  the fail in CEE-5 exports  was significantly
larger than the decline  in OECD  import  demand  overall.'° The latter  fell by around 12 percent in aggregate
over this period,  while CEE-5  exports  declined  by nearly  30 percent.
As can be seen from Table 3, during 1981-83  all exports with the exception  of mineral fuels
contracted  much  more than OECD  imports. The most affected  were manufactures:  the ratio of the average
annual  (negative)  growth  rate of CEE-5  exports  to the OECD  import (negative)  growth  rate was 7.12. There
were only a few bright spots: all CEE-5  economies  recorded  a lower fall in exports  of mineral  fuels (as a
result, their market shares for fuels increased);  Czechoslovak  exports of agricultural  products increased;
Hungary  substantially  expanded  its exports of raw materials  and mineral  fuels; and Romania  increased  Its
exports  of ores and nonferrous  metals. Bulgaria's  and especially  Poland's exports collapsed  in all product
9 The worst  performer  was  Bulgaria,  whose  share  in 1989  in total  OECD  imports  of manufactured  goods
was  5'.3 percent  lower  than  in the  peak  year  of 1980. Romana's  share  dropped  by 41 percent  in comparison  with
its peak  year  in 1980,  Poland's  by 40.4 percent,  Czechoslovakia's  by 27  percent,  and Hungary's  by 28.3  perment.
10 For  this  reason,  the  data  for 1983  or 1984  is used  as the  base  in the  inter-temporal  comparative  analysis.9
categories  except  for mineral  fuels.
While  the fail in CEE-S  exports  to the OECD  in the early 1980s  was attributed  to the recession  in the
OECD  and the deterioration  in East-West  political  relations," in the second half of the 1980s  East-West
relations  ceased  to be an active  constraint  on commercial  relations. Yet CEE-S  exports  did not recover.
By  the end of the 1980s,  despite  domestic  political  pressures  to expand  exports  to obtain  much-needed
hard currency,  CEE-5  exporters  failed to recapture  the losses  in market shares  that they had suffered  during
the  breakdown  period. As can  be seen from Table  3, the growth  in the total exports  of CEE-5  feil behind  that
of total  OECD  import  demand  on average  by around  12  percent  annually,  mainly  because  of poor  performance
in manufactures  exports.  The CEE-S region improved  its position in  OECD markets vis-a-vis other
competitors  in food, mineral  fuels and metals,  with the highest  ratio being  for mineral  fuels; OECD  Import
demand  was falling  at an annual  average  rate of 3.2 percent,  while  exports  from the CEE-5  were increasing
by 1 percent  per annum. Agricultural  and ores/nonferrous  metals  exports also increased  at rates  higher  than
the growth  in import  demand. Both of these product  categories  had registered  a significant  loss in OECD
market  shares  during  the  breakdown  period,  but both  subsequently  regained  their 1980  market  share. Hungary
and Poland increased their presence in OECD markets, while Bulgaria's and Romania's shares fell
zipitously  in the second  period. The FCSK  also  experienced  a loss in market  share, though  a sma.  ass
than the two Ralkan  countries.
Hungary's  and Poland's  export  performance  stands  out. Their efforts  to reform  their  trading  regimes
and expand  their trade links with the OECD,  both precipitated  by sign!ficant  sovereign  debt accrued  in the
1970s, were impressive by CEE-5 standards, though not by the standards of other exporters.  While their
shares  in total CEE-5  exports  fell during  the  breakdown  period,  it increased  significantly  in the second  period-
-from 49 percent  in 1983  to 56 percent in 1989. Poland  retained  its position  as the largest  CEE-5  exporter
to the OECD  (32  percent  in 1989),  while  Hungary  became  the second  largest exporter  (24 percent  in 1989);
the shares  of the FCSK  and Romania  feil from 23 to 21 percent  and 23 to 19 percent, respectively,  between
1983  and 1989.
The move  toward the status  of a supplier  of nonrenewable,  natural resource-intensive  products  was
most pronounced  for the FCSK and the Ralkan  countries  and least for Hungary  and Poland. Hungary  and
11 Relations  were  especiaUy  adversarial  in the early 1980s  following  the Soviet  invasion  of Afghanistan
in December  1979  and the imposition  of martial  law in Poland  in December  of 1981. One  of the  largest  declines
was  in Polish  exports  during  the Solidarity  period  in 1981. Polish  exports,  which  accounted  for about  35 percent
of the  CEE-5  total,  fell by 35 percent  in 1981.10
Poland increased their share  in CEE-5 exports of manufactures, with Poland registering the largest increase.'2
Poland took Hungary's position as the largest exporter of agricultural producs:  its share rose from 35 percent
in  1984 to  41 percent in  1989, while Hungary's  share fell from 37  percent to 35  percent.  The FCSK
Increased its dominance as the largest exporter of raw  materials and  increased its  share in all product
categories except manufactures.  Romaia's  share declined steeply in all product categories except ores and
nonferrous metals.  So did Bulgaria's share, with the exception of raw materials.
TabLe  3:  Ratios  of CEE-S  Export  Groith  Rates  to OECD  Import  Growth  Rates  by
Produt  Cateories, 1981-83  to 1990-91
1981-83  1984-89  1990-91  1981-83  1984-89  1990-91
CEE-5  iBultaria
Foods  and  Feeds  2.35*  1.42  1.14  2.15*  0.82  .73
Mineral  Fuels  0.74*  -0.30*  -0.98  0.20*  1.67*  (-3.89)
Ores  and  Non-Ferrous  Netals  1.46*  1.19  -4.07*  2.26*  1.02*  -15.98*
Raw  Materials  1.31*  0.70  -0.77*  1.03^  1.68  4.44*
Manufactures  7.12*  0.80  2.72  9.28*  0.56  2.30
Total  Exports  2.31*  0.88  1.87  2.46*  0.43  1.54
Czechoslovakia  Hurma
Foods  and Feeds  "  1.47  0.85  1.40*  1.31  1.42
Mineral  Fuels  V  0.04*  (-0.73)  -1.74*  -1.97*  0.60
Ores and  Non-Ferrous  Metals  0.44*  1.11  -17.20*  0.73*  1.51  -0.51*
Raw Materials  1.00*  0.66  3.25*  -0.31*  0.97  -4.53*
Manufactures  4.18*  0.63  3.80  5.12*  0.86  2.97
Total  Exports  1.48*  0.76  2.92  1.31*  1.09  2.37
Poland  Romania
Foods  and  Feeds  2.68*  1.88  1.26  5.14*  0.32  0.91
Mineral  Fuets  0.53*  -0.09*  1.14  0.10*  -1.16*  (-4.13)
Ores  and  Non-Ferrous  Metals  1.83'  0.98  -6.95*  -1.31*  2.42  11.61*
Raw Materials  2.00'  0.62  -6.11*  2.42'  0.44  11.39*
Manufactures  13.52*  1.23  4.10  4.36*  0.63  (-1.11)
Total  Exports  3.64*  1.12  3.09  1.56*  0.67  (-2.56)
Note:  *  denotes  negative  growth  rates  in  OECD  imports;
(-)  denotes  a negative  growth  rate  of CEE-5  exports.
Source:  Se;  Table  1.
The regional composition of CEE-5 aggregate  exports to OECD economies remained relatively stable
throughout the  1980s.  The shares going to the EC-10 (68 percent) and the EFTA (18 percent) declined
slightly between the two periods, while the shares going to other OECD counteies increased slightly.  These
changes were the result of the redirection of exports away from Europe by Hungary and Romania.
12  Poland's share rose from 21 to 27 perceat between 1984  and 1989, whilo Hungary's share increased
from 21 to 24 percent.  The FCSK, which remained the second  largest exporter of manufactures  in the CEE-S
region in the  1984-89 period,  registered  a fall from 26 to 25 percent.11
The picture  that emerges  from this analysis  can  be summa'zed  as foilows:  (i) the export  performance
of the CEE-S  was very unimpressive  in the 1980s  despite  efforts lt reforming  foreign  trade regimes  under
central planning;  (ii) the decline  in their competitive  position  in OECD markets, already observed in the
1970s,  continued  through the 1980s;  (iii) the contraction  in their prmence in OECD markets, particularly
notable  in the early 1980s,  was  not reversed;  (iv)  their exports  were extremely  vulnerable  to changes  in OECD
import  demand;  (v)  the commodity  composition  of exports  shifted  toward  low  value-added,  resource-intensive
products;  and (vi) the role of OECD  countries  other  than the EC-10 and  ETrA remained  marginal  for the
CEE-5 except for Romania.  The symptoms  of a deep structural crisis wvte clearly  visible in their export
performance  in the OECD.  Against  this dismal ovexali  picture, the export performance  of the two most
reformed  CPEs, Hungary  and Poland, was significantly  better.
IV. THE EXPORT  UPSWING:  IN DEFIANCE  OF PAST TRENDS
The extrapolation  of export trends characteristic  of the 1984-89  period would yield the following
predictions  for the CEE-S in the 1990s: the region's share in OECD exports would continue slipping,
especially in  manufactures;  their export profile would continue moving to  agricultural products and
nonrenewable  natural  resources;  Poland's  and  Hungary's  positit.  ,nong  the CEE-5  would  continue  improving
although  at an uneven  pace;  the FCSK's  relative  position  would  continue  declining,  albeit  at a slower  rate  than
that of Bulgaria  and Romania;  the weight  of the latter two countries  in CEE-5  exports  and OECD  imports
would continue shrinling; and the reliance on EC-10 markets would slowly increase.  In addition, the
contraction  in investment  activity throughout  the region in the 1980s and the poor match between its
investment/production  patterns  and international  markets  would  give extra credibility  to the forecast  of no
significant  improvement  in export  performance  in the 1990s. With these expectations,  the designers  of the
Polish stabilization-cum-adjustment  program assumed only a  slight increase of hard currency exports
(Kolodko,  1991:13). Yet 1990,  the first year after  the collapse  of communist  regimes,  proved  to be a turning
point  in the region's  export  performance  in the OECD,  initiaily  especially  because  of Polish  export  expansion.
Appendix  Table 1 summarizes  information  on the export  upswing  in 1990  and 1991.
A.  Challenging  the Proiections
The developments  in CEE-5  export  performance  in the period  immediately  following  the collapse  of
central  planning  defied some and confirmed  other aspects  of predictions  based on trends dominant  in the
1980s. While  the 1990  and 1991  improvement  in the relative  position  of Hungary  and Poland,  both among
CEE-S  exporters  and in OECD  markets,  and the deterioration  of the export  performance  of the two Balkan12
countries  came as no surprise,  the pace at which  exports  of Bulgaria  and Romania  fell in 1990  and those of
Hungary  and Poland rose defied  all predictions. Between  1984-89  and 1990-91,  the share of Bulgaria  and
Romania  in CEE-5  exports  fell from  28 percent  to below  14 percent,  mostly  because  of the collapse  of exports
of oil and manufactured  products. At the same  time, the share of Hungary  and Poland  in total CEE-5  exports
to the OECD  increased  from around  51 percent in the 1984-89  period to 64 percent  in the 1990-91  period,
mainly  because  of the expansion  of manufactured  exports.
Contrary  to expectations,  the  share of the region  in total OECD  import  demand  increased  in both 1990
and 1991  thanks  to export  expansion  by the Central  European  troika  whose  share in CEE-5  exports  increased
from an average  of 72 percent in the 1984-89  period  to 80 percent  in 1991. The increase  was mainly  the
result  of the reversal of two trends-stagnating  Czechoslovak  exports  and decliilng regional  competitiveness
in manufactures.  The FCSK's exports  soared in 1991  (see column  b of Appendix  Table 1), and the share of
CEE-5  manufactures  in OECD  imports  increased  in both 1990  and 1991. Since  the  shares  in OECD  markets
for raw materials  and especially  for foods  and feeds  and ores  and nonferrous  metals  also increased,  while  that
for mineral  fuels and raw materials  contracted,  the region's  export profile  continued  to be characterized  by
a heavy  reliance  on natural  resource-intensive  products,  though it has been somewhat  attenuated  (see Table
1).
B.  Reforms  Make a Difference
The developments  in CEE-5 export  performance  in the 1990-91  period sharpened  the differences
between  the most reformed  economies  of the Central  European  troika (the  CEE-3)  and the Balkan  countries
(Bulgaria  and Romania). The latter  group  was not only marginalized  vis-a-vis  the CEE-3  in OECD  markets,
but its export  profile shifted  towards  low value-added  products.
The collapse  of Romania's  exports in 1990  and 1991  reflected  the acceleration  of a tendency  that
began  in the mid-1980s. In 1991,  the value  of Romanian  exports  to the OECD  was almost  50 percent lower
than in 1987. By comparison,  Czechoslovak,  Hungarian  and Polish  exports  expanded  at double  digit growth
rates in 1990  and 1991.  Contary to expecaions, the driving  force of the troika export boom in OECD
markets  was manufactures. Their share in OECD  manufactures  import  demand,  though still insignificant,
increased  by 41 percent from an average  of 0.5 percent  in 1984-89  to 0.7 percent  in 1990-91.
As Table  4 shows,  manufactures  accounted  for 80 percent  of the increase  in the value  of total  exports
of the CEE-3  between  1989  and 1991. Exports  of manufactures  accounted  for more  than 100  percent  of the
increase  in Czechoslovak  exports  in 1990  and for 96 percent  of the increase  for 1990  and 1991  together. A
detailed account  of manufactured  goods' success  stories in OECD  markets  has not been developed  so far.
However, a summary  examination  of Polish data suggests  that important  items in the Polish export  drive13
included garments, cinemicals  (organic and inorganic, polymerization  products, wood- and resin-based
chemical  products),  paper and products  of paper, textile  yams, non-metallic  mineral  manufactures  (cement,
lime, fabricated  construction  materials,  mineral  manufactures,  glassware,  pottery),  iron and steel  products  (pig
iron, ingots, rails), manufactres of metal (hangars, household  equipment  of base metals), specialized
machinery  (machine  tools), mechanical  handling  equipment  (cranes,  works trucks),  household  type  electrical
and non-electrical  equipment,  non-motorized  trailer and other vehicles, and ships and boats.- 3 At first
glance,  it seems  that no major  shift in revealed  comparative  advantage  for manufactures  occurred  in the 1989-
91 period  as compared  with the 1984-89  period.
Table 4:  The Rlot  of  Nuwmfactures  in  the  OECD  Export Growth of  CEE-3, 1989 to  1991
Value  Increase  in  value  Share  of  Manufactures  in
(mill.  US$)  (mill.  USS)  lncrease  in  Total  Exports
(in  percent)
1989  1990  1991  1989-90 1990-91  1989-90  1990-91
Czechoslovakia
Total  Exports  3924  45S5  6270  661  1685  ---  - --  -
Exports  of  Manufactures  2545  3218  4788  673  1570  102  93
Hunaarv
Total  Exports  4359  5511  6451  1152  940  ----  ....
Exports  of  Manul  res  2420  3347  4035  927  686  81  73
Total  Export  5879  8436  9546  2557  1110  ----  ....
Exports  of  Manufactures  2771  4390  5388  1619  998  63  90
Total  CEE-
Total  Exports  14162  18531  22268  4369  3737
Exports  of  Manufactures  7736  10955  14210  3219  3255  74  80
SOURCE:  See Table  I
The increase in CEE-3 exports is truly astounding  considering  their export performance  and
investment  policies in the 1980s,  the fact that SOEs were mainly responsible  for the increased  exports of
manufactures,  and also that the CEE-3 did not have export supporting  institutions  similar to Hermes in
Germany  or Ex-Im  Bank in the United  States. More detailed  analysis  is warranted.
C.  Germany:  Locomotive  of CEE-S  Exoort  Growth
During the export growth of 1990-91,  the geographic  pattern of CEE-S exports changed, with a
movement  towards  European  markets  in general  and Germany  in particular. The shift of CEE-5  exports  to
the EC-10  began  in the late 1980s  and was amplified  in the 1990-91  period;  the share of the EC-10  in CE-S
13  For a detailed  analysis,  see Kaminsli,  1993:7-8.14
total exports  increased  from 68 percent  in 1984-89  to 73 percent  in  990 and to 77 percent  in 1991. The main
engine  of CEE-5  export  growth  was Germany  (see  Table S)--excluding  Germany,  the EC markets  for Central
European  products  stagnated  in 1991. The share of Germany  in CEE-S exports  to the EC-10 substantially
increased  for all countries  except  Hungary,  and the share  of Germany  in total OECD  imports  from  the CEE-S
increased  between  1989  and 1990  by almost  50 percent--from  34 percent to 49 percent.
Table 5:  The  Role of Gow  n  the Export Grewth  of  CEE-5  in  1990 nd  1991
A.  Share of Gerenwy  in OED aid  EC-10  Ixqorts from the  CEE-5  (in  percent)
Bulgaria  Czechostovakia  Hunaarv
1989  1990  1991  1989  1990  1991  1989  1990  1991
OECD  23  27  33  34  37  49  33  37  40
EC-10  32  35  42  43  51  63  55  55  58
Poland  R  nia
1989  1990  1991  1989  1990  1991  1989  1990  1991
OECD  32  38  52  14  28  36  33  37  45
EC-1O  46  50  58  20  37  42  47  52  59
B.  Ainnul  Increases  in  Value  of  lcowts  from  CEE  untries  (mitt.  USS)
Bulgaria  Czefhgsloakfe  Hunaarv
1990  1991  1990  1991  1990  1991
Germany  72  76  355  1388  598  553
EC-9 (Germany  excluded)  76  -10  196  240  306  197
Other  OECD  19  .9  110  58  249  190
Memorandum:  Share of  the  increase  in
OECD  imports  absorbed by Germany  43  134  54  82  52  59
(in  percent)
Pots  Romania  CEE-3
1990  1991  1990  1991  1990  1991
Germany  1320  1147  -127  40  2273  3088
EC-9 (Germany  excluded)  928  8  -658  -186  1431  445
Other OECD  308  -4  -312  -240  667  203
Hemorandu: Share of  the  increase  in
OECD pgorts absorbed by Germany  52  103  --  --  52  83
(in  percent)
Source: See Table  1
Although  Germany  has been traditionally  the largest OECD  trading partAer  of Central  Europe, its
significance  increased  for each  of the CEE-5  economies  in 1990  and 1991. The share of Germany  in OECD
imports from Romania  surged from 14 percent in 1989  to 52 percent in 1991, mainly because  exports to
Germany  fell less than to other partners in 1990  and they actually  increased  in 1991.  For Bulgaria,  the
increase  in sales to German  firms  more  than offset  the contraction  of other OECD  markets  in 1991. German15
markets  absorbed  about 54 percent of the increase  in exports  from the FCSK  in 1990, and 82 percent  of tbis
increase  in 1991.  As a result, the share of Germany  in Czechoslovak  exports increased  by 15 percentage
points between  1989  and 1991. The  German  share  in Hungarian  exports  to the OECD  was slightly  lower  than
that of other CEE-5  countries,  but Germany  took three quarters  of the increase  in Hungarian  exports to the
EC in 1991. Poland reoriented  its exports  to Germany  in a dramatic  fashion  in 1991: its exports  in current
prices to EFTA, North America  and Japan contracted,  to other EC-9 countries  stagnated,  but to Germany
grew by more  than US$1  billion. Germany's  share in OECD  exports  of the troika  increased  from 33 percent
in 1989 to 45 percent in 1991.
Moreover,  Germany's  share  in CEE-5  exports  to the  EC-10  increased  significantly  in nearly  all major
product  categories. The only exceptions  were ores and nonferrous  metals  for Czechoslovak,  Hungarian  and
Romanian exports and raw materials for Hungarian  and Rom; .al  exports.  The largest increases in
Germany's  share in exports to the EC were: for Bulgara, mineral  fuels (from 7.5 percent in 1989  to 62.2
percent in 1991)  and raw materials  (18.3 percent  to 36 percent);  for the FCSK, manufactures  (43.4 percent
to 61.5 percent)  and agricultural  products  (55.8 percent  to 69.6 percent);  for Hungary,  agricultural  products
(37.1 percent  to 47.2 percent)  and manufactures  (56 percent  to 62.4 percent);  for Poland,  mineral  fuels (32.5
percent  to 54.5 percent)  and manufactures  (46.5 percent  to 59.7 percent);  and for Rom.;  i, mineral  fuels (0.7
percent  to 5.6 percent)  and agricultural  products  (40.1 percent  to 52.9 perc&-at).
Table 6:  Share  of  the CEE-5  in Gern  lmports, by Major  Product  Categories, in  1989  an1 1991,  and the Percent
Chag  in Share  betwn  1989  an  1991
BULGARIA  CZECHOSLOVAKIA  HUNGARY
1959  1991  Change  1989  1991  Change  1989  1991  Change
in percent  in percent  in percent
Foods  and Feeds  0.14  0.18  36  0.46  0.52  13  1 01  1.31  29
Raw  Materials  0.08  0.11  46  1.02  0.87  -15  0.58  0.67  16
Ores  2 Non-Ferrous  Metals  0.06  0.24  309  0.36  0.92  153  047  0.52  11
Mineral Fuels  0.02  0.02  -5  0.99  0.60  -40  0.32  0.26  -18
Manufactures  0.05  0.07  21  0.43  0.84  94  0.49  0.63  30
Total all  c_oditfes  0.07  0.08  28  0.49  0.79  60  0.53  0.66  25
POLAND  R_OANIA  CE-3
Foods  and Feeds  1.38  1.50  9  0.15  0.12  -21  2.85  3.32  17
Raw  Materials  0.85  1.44  70  0.31  0.10  -66  2.45  2.98  22
Ores  L Non-Ferrous  Metals  1.96  3.94  101  0.46  0.12  -75  2.79  5.38  93
Mineral Fuels  0.80  1.16  44  0.03  0.03  10  2.10  2.01  -4
Manufactures  0.49  0.92  87  0.36  0.22  -37  1.41  2.39  69
Totat alt  coidities  0.71  1.13  59  0.30  0.19  -38  1.73  2.58  49
Source:  See  Table 1.
As a result of the export  expansion  between  1989  and 1991, the competitve  position  of the CEE-S,
except for Romania  (whose share fell in all product categories  except for its traditional  exports of oil),
improved  considerably  in German  markets  for all major  product  categories  with  the exception  of mineral  fuels.16
As can be seen from Table 6, the troika's share in total German  imports  increased  by almost 50 percent,
mainly  thanks  to exports of manuifactures.  The FCSK's  share in German  imports  of manufactured  products
almost doubled,  Poland's share increased  by 87 percent, and Hungary's by 30 percent.  Bulgaria. whose
exports  to the OECD  stagnated  in the 1989-91  period,  increased  its share in German  markets  by 28 percent.
The  major  item in the manufactures  export  drive  to Germany  was mac.inery  and transport  equipment.
Czechoslovak  exports  of machinery  and transport  equipment  (SITC.  7) to Germany  increased  by 56S  percent
(from $101 million  to $663  million)  and to other  EC-10  countries  (excluding  Germany)  by 36 percent (from
$256 million  to $347 million);  Polish machinery  and transport  equipment  exports to Germany  increased  by
254 percent (from $131 million  to $464 million)  and to other EC-10 countries  by 4 percent (from $340 to
$347 million);  and Hungarian  exports of machinery  and transport  equipment  to Germany  increased  by 146
percent (from  $229 million  to $564  million)  and to other  EC-10  countries  by 55 percent (from $128  to $199
million). These  exports were previously  absorbed  mainly  by the FSU.
The expansion  of trade  with  unified  Germany  was  apparently  not related  to commercial  links  inherited
from the GDR's membership  in the CMEA. Except  for contracts  between  the former  GDR and the FSU, all
ties between  the GDR and other  CMEA  members  were severed  and orders  canceled. The dismantling  of the
CMEA  soft p  _nts mechanism  at the end of 1990  precipitated  the collapse  of trade between  the former
GDR and the CEE.5; CEE-5  importers  were no longer  willing  to spend scarce  foreign  exchange  on goods
produced  in firms of the former  GDR.
The 1990  and 1991  export drive to Germany  allowed  producers  from the CEE-3 to regain market
shares they lost in the OECD  countries  during  the 1980s. Hungary  regained  its 1980  peak  share in OECD
imports  in 1989, and the FCSK did so in 1992. Despite  its impressive  growth  in 1990  and 1991, Poland's
share in 1991  was still slightly  lower than it was in 1980.
V. THE REVERSAL  IN CEE-3  EXPORT  PERFORMANCE:  SOME  PREL1MINARY  HYPOTHESES
As argued  earlier, the reversal  in CEE-3 export  performance  trends in OECD markets  cannot be
attributed  to a better  match  between  CEE-3  investment  strategies  and imrport  demand  in international  markets,
because  increased  exports  came from productive  capacities  created  under central  planning. Neither  can it be
explained  by a sudden upsurge of OECD import demand,  because CBE-3 producers outperformed  other
suppliers  and significantly  increased  their market  shares.  No massive  transfer  of state-owned  assets to the
private  sector  took place in 1990  and 1991,  so the  improvement  cannot  be attributed  to privately-owned  firms,
more responsive  to market signals. Therefore,  ono should  look for explanations  in reforms influencing  the
behavior  of economic  actors,  changes  in external  opportunities,  and incentives  to export. The objective  of
this section  is to identify links between  domestic  and external  cicumstances, on the one hand, and export17
performance in OECD markets, on the other.  The results are tenuous at best, however, as all policy variables
were in a state of flux during the initial stages of the transition from central planning.
The major external factor was the collapse of the CMEA, wl-  '*h increased the proportion of aggregate
output no longer demanded in CMEA markets.  Goods previously exported to the CMEA became available
for domestic consumption and/or export to other trading partners; in the extreme, production capacities for
unwanted goods would be shut down. 14 The major changes in domestic circumstances were the liberalization
of prices and restrictive monetary  and fiscal  policies, together with the introduction of changes in the incentive
structures for SOEs (which remained dominant economic actors during the initial stage of the transition).
These measures produced a shift from a supply- to a demand-constrained  economy, to borrow an apt phrase
from Janos Kornai, and led  to a  dramatic change in  the domestic demand structure--a very  significant
contraction of demand for some products and some increases for others.  The net result, however, was a fall
in aggregate domestic demand.'5 The combination of these changes with the introduction of limited current
account convertibility and liberalization of the foreign trade regime provided incentives to domestic firms to
look for markets abroad.
A.  The Collapse of the CMEA
For  the  period under  discussion, the collapse of the  CMEA was the  only external event with
potentally  significant implications for Central European exports to the OECD.  Although the change in the
polidcal status of the region vis-a-vis the West clearly had a positive impact on its export performance in 1990
and 1991, this cannot explain the dramatic shift in export patterns.  The region's access to OECD markets
did not improve dramadcally, although the extension of GSP (Generalized System of Preferences) treatment
to Central European countries played some role.'6 (it was irrelevant for Romania which had had GSP status,
14  As long as the CMEA-TR  settlements  mechanism  existed, there was also another temporary  option: a
government  might subsidize  its domestic  producers  by running a trade surplus  in TRs, thereby subsidizing  another
country  (or reducing  its non-convertible  currency  debt). This option  was pursued  by the Polish  government  in 1990,
mainly in its trade with the FSU.
15 For a summary  of factors contributing  to the fall in aggregate  output in Central and Eastern Europe,
see Blejer ard Gelb (1992:1-3).
16  The EC granted  GSP to Hungary  and Poland  in 1990,  and to Czecho-Slovakia  and Bulgaria  on January
1, 1991. Although  all GSP schemes  granted unilaterally  by industrial  countries exclude  major textile  and clothing
products in which the CEE-5 have comparative  advantage  (Erzan, Holmes and Safadi, 1992:26),  EC quotas for
imports  from the CEE-5 were significantly  raised.  In addition,  thanks  to the GSP status, the simple average tariff
on CEE-5 imports  significantly  declined from around  8 percent in 1988  to 1 percent in 1991. Calculated  from the
UNCTAD-World  Bank SMART  (Software  for Market Analysis  and Restrictions  on Trade) data base.18
albeit with many special  restrictions,  since 1971, Schumacher  and Mobius, 1992:2). The elimination  of
quantitative  restrictions  maintained  by the EC against  Poland  improved  its market access.' 7 Barriers  to the
CEE-3  economies'  traditionally  competitive  exports, iron, steel, textiles,  clothing  and agricultural  products,
remained  in effect in 1991,  although  they  were not binding.1 8 Ihe European  Association  Agreements  signed
with the CEE-3 in December  1991  were also not relevant  for the 1990-91  period,  because  their provisions
were to be phased in over the 10 years beginning  in 1992.'9 Finally, the granting  of MFN status by the
United States did not have a signif atn imnpact;  Hungary had MFN status throughout  the period under
consideration,  while Bulgaria  and the FCSK obtained  it in 1991; Poland's MFN status  in the United  States
was restored  in 1989,  but its trade with the United  States  accounted  for less than  5 percent  of its total trade;
and Romania's  MFN status was suspended  in 1988, but its exports were already collapsing  for domestic
reasons. Hence,  among  possible  external  factors  accounting  for shifts  in trade patterns  and imnroved  export
performance  in OECD  markets,  the collapse  of the CMEA  was  the'most  reltvant  event  in the 1990-91  period,
overshadowing  the disappearance  of East-West  political  divisions  in Europe.
The problem  of adjustment  to changing  conditions  within  the CMEA  emerged  much  earlier  than in
1990. The official  dissolution  of the CMEA  was the result, not the cause, of the rapidly  declining  Soviet
capability  to sustain "soft"  settlements  in intra-CMEA  trade. Thanks  to the falling  oil price in intra-CMEA
trade, most CEE-5  countries  began  to run trade surpluses  with the FSU  in non-convertible  TRs in 1988. As
a result, trade-related  debts to the FSU accumulated  by CMEA  partners  between  1975  and 1987  were "...
suddenly  wiped  out by 1988"  (Lavigne,  1990:36). The erosion  of Soviet  ability  to pay for imports  forced
other CMEA  governments  to introduce  various measures  restraining  exports to the FSU and encouraging
exports to  hard-currency  markets.  With the collapse of the Soviet ability to  maintain  TR payments
arrangements  in 199(, CMEA members  began switching  from TRs to hard currencies in their internal
transactions,  which  eventually  led  to the formal  dissolution  of the CMEA  internal  settlements  mechanism  on
17 This  decision  coincided  with  the  introduction  of the Economic  Transformation  Program  on January  1,
1990. In addition,  the non-specific  quantitative  restrictions  were  suspended  until  December  31, 1991.
18 Bilateral  quotas  imposed  by the  EC on imports  from  Central/Eastern  Europe  were  not  very restrictive,
and their number  had declined  already between  1985 and 1989. For instance,  the number  of Multi-Fiber
Arrangement  (MFA)  quotas  fell from 71 in 1985  to 54 in 1989,  and around  30 percent  of them had a quota
utilization  rate lower  than  90 percent  (See  Erzan  and  Holmes,  1992). The  importance  of quotas  for other  products
was  also  limited  because  they  were  rarely  utilized  (Rodrick  1992:28).
19 Since  the  free  trade  provisions  of 'Europe  Agreements"  became  effective  on March  1, 1992,  the  CEE-3
has obtained  duty-free  access  to EC  markets  for a wide  range  of manufactures.  For instance,  imports  of more  than
50 percent  of Polish  manufactured  goods  are not subject  to barriers  (Nogaj,  1992). For a discussion  of the
Agreements,  see Pohl  and Sorsa,  1992.19
January 1, 1991.A
The level of vulnerability to the collapse of CMEA trade was not uniform among the CEE-5, and the
extent of the shock from the collapse of CMEA trade was also less abrupt than official statistics might suggest.
Since the  1960s, CEE-5 trade  with the OECD  had tended to  increase faster than CMEA trade,  despite
declining international  competitiveness  in manufactures. In the 1980s, the quality of CEE-5 manufactures and
their international competitiveness  was lower than it was in the 1970s (Poznanski, 1988:46-52). The declining
international competitiveness of CEE-5  manufactures forced them  to offer industrial products at  heavily
discounted prices, which in turn implied a substantial devaluation of the TR relative to the US dollar.  The
revalued trade figures suggest a long-term trend of declining shares of the CMEA in CEE-5 total exports.
Between 1970 and 1990, this share fell from 76 percent to 54 percent for Bulgaria, from 64 percent to 37
percent for the FCSK,  from 62 percent to 31  percent for  Hungary, from 60  percent to  39 percent for
Poland, 2"  and from 50 percent to 24 percent for Romania.'  Hence, although the CMEA and the FSU were
the major trading partners of the CEE-5, a significant redirection of trade to the non-CMEA markets occurred
prior to 1990.  Still, the CLE-5 countries were extremely vulnerable to economic developments in the FSU
as the FSU was their single largest trading partner.  The Soviet portion of intra-European CMEA trade was
around 70 percent between 1987 and 1990 and 74 percent in 1991, despite the contraction in Soviet imports
and exports.23
Table 7 shows ratios of CMEA (excluding  the former GDR and non-European members) exports to
OECD exports for the CEE-4 (excluding Bulgaria24). The changes in ratios over the 1987-91 period show
that efforts to orient trade away from the CMEA were quite successful and that a dramatic realignment of
-7  By the end of 1990, around  50 percent of CMEA trade was conducted  in hard currency, though  the
proportion  varied for individual  countries  (Rosati, 1992).
21  The share of the former CMEA  in Poland's exports (in current prices)  fell to 16.9 percent of the total
in 1991, with the FSU accounting  for 11 percent, and Czechoslovakia  for 4.7 percent.
22 For revalued  estimates  of trade of the CEE-5 and the FSU, see Pohl and Sorsa (1992).
23  Calculated  from data in IMF Direction  of Trade Statistics  Yearbook, 1992. Non-European  members
of the CMEA included  Cuba, Mongolia  and Vietnam. The figures  do not include Bulgaria,  for which  no data on
the trade with the Soviet Union are available in the IMF statistics,  or the German Democratic  Republic, which
ceased to exist as a state.
24 Bulgaria's trade was more  oriented  toward  the FSU than  the other CEE-5.  The ratios were as follows:
1988  - 5.3; 1989 - 5.1; 1990 - 3.6; 1991 - 2.0.  Because  these data are derived from other sources, they are not
included  in Table 7.  The tendency  is the same as for other countries, although  the decline  was mainly  the result
of the collapse of CMEA exports (they fell from US$4.8 bill. in 1988 to US$2.0 bill. in 1991), and stagnating
exports to the West (their value rose slightly  from US$900  million  to US$1 billion  in 1991).20
export  patterns  has taken  place since 1987.
Table  7:  Ratio  of  CMEA  Exporta  to  OECD  Exports,  1967-91
Nemoranduts:
Czechostnvakia Hungary  Poland  t.mania  Standard  CEE-3
deviation
1987  2.20  1.18  0.82  0.95  0.54  1.33
1988  2.04  0.99  0.91  1.13  0.45  1.25
1989  1.73  0.78  0.81  1.06  0.38  1.06
1990  1.01  0.49  0.64  0.85  0.20  0.68
1991  0.56  0.41  0.51  0.58  0.07  0.49
Source:  IMF,  Direction  of Trade  Stgtistics  Yearbook,  1992.
Table 8 provides  additional  information  relating  to the switch from CMEA  to OECD markets. It
presents  the annual  changes  in the value  of exports  of the CEE-3  and Romania  in 1990  and 1991,  as well as
between  1987  and 1991  (the period  over which  the value of intra-CMEA  exports  was falling),  to the FSU,
Table  8:  Changes  in  Value  of  CEE-4 Exports  to  FSUJ  CEE-4.  and OECD,  1990 and  1991  (million  US S)
Czechostovakia  Hungary  Poland  Romania
1990  1991 TotaL  1990  1991  Total  1990  1991  Total  1990  1991  Total
1988-91  1988-91  1988-91  1991-88
FSU  -1398  -898  -2910  -482  194  -1001  78  335  1081  -1025  -572  -1309
CEE-4  -745  -232  -1007  -243  -236  -598  498  -834  -67  -632  -310  -1164
OECD  661  1685  2910  1152  940  2856  2557  1110  4845  -1097  -387  -1791
TOTAL  -1481  556  -1007  427  898  1257  3133  611  5859  -2754  -1269  -4264
Memorandum:  FSII:  Balance  of Trade
FSU:  -152  +1054  -442  -485  -1282  -1410  +687  -57
Source:  IMF,  Direction  of Trade  Statistics  Yearbook,  1992
to othcr European  CMEA  members,  and to OECD  countries  (EC, EFTA, North America  and Japan). Two
points  are worth  noting.  First, the increase  in exports  of the CEE-3  economies  to the OECD  more  than  offset
the fail in exports to former CMEA markets.25 Second, there were significant  differences in export
performance  among  the CEE-5  economies. Poland  stands  out. Its exports  to the FSU increased  in both 1990
and 1991, while exports from other countries  fell, and the annual increases  in 1990 and 1991  followed
expansion  in both 1988 and 1989. The overall  increase  between 1987  and 1991  was slightly  above  US$1
billion. It should  be noted  that  while  the data  on intra-CMEA  trade until 1990  suffered  from problems  related
A
25 Although  the amounts  offset  each  other, the  terms  of trade  and budgetary  implications  are different.
The  collapse  of intra-CMEA  trade  and the switch  to world  prices  contributed  to government  budget  deficits  in the
CEE-5,  as a study  on Hungary  demonstrates  (Abel,  Hillman  and Tanr,  1992).21
to converting  ruble-denominated  trade flows  into US dollars,'  litis  was not the case in 1991  when around
98 percent of all transactions  were carried out in hard currency  (UN ECE, 1992:85). In consequence,  the
data for 1991  provide  a statistically  less distorted  image  of the realigmnent  in export  patterns.
B.  The Redirection  of T'ormer  CMEA  Sales  to the OECQ
This section  addresses  the extent  of diversion  of exports  from the CMEA  to the OECD. While  more
research  Is needed,  some  preliminary  observations  concerning  the reorientation  of exports  can  be derived  from
examining  changes  in Poland's exports in 1990 and 1991 (i.e., when an almost complete  switch to hard
currency settlements  in intra-CMEA  trade occurred), and in  Hungarian  and Polish exports of selected
manufactures  to the FSU and the EC.
Although  countries  experiences  varied  according  to their  former  involvement  in specialization  schemes
within  the  CMEA,  we would  argue  that  the pattern  of change  in Hungary's  and Poland's  tade has been  shared
by other former CMEA members. Their econc ies were under broadly  similar administrative  economic
systems,  they all pursued  similar  inward-oriented  development  strategies,  and they all were part of the radial
pattern  of industrial  specialization  organized  around  the FSU. Further, within  the CMEA  trading  area, they
all sought to minimize  exports of hard currency  earners  and maximi;  z: ports of goods  which  could  not be
sold in international  markets.
According  to conventional  wisdom,  CEE-5  exports  of manufactured  goods  to the CMEA,  especially
to the FSU, consisted  of 'soft" goods  noncompetitive  in world  markets  because  of high production  costs and
low quality (Marrese  and Vanous, 1983).  Since  in the short term the quality could not be significantly
improved,  the only means  available  to producers  of soft goods  to sell them in international  markets  was to
offer them  at heavily  discounted  prices. However,  there were two obstacles  to this course of action. Frst,
the trade-off  between  low  prices  and product  quality  was limited:  even  huge price cuts  may not have  attracted
customers. Second, by 1991 producers  in the CEE-3  performed  in a new environment  where financial
performance  became  linked  to sales revenues. So they could  no longer  ignore  world prices. For these two
reasons,  the capacity  of SOEs  to compete  through  price discounts  was eroded. Therefore,  one would  expect
a very limited  redirection  of exports  of manufactures  from the CMEA  to the OECD.
This expectation  is borne out by Rodrick  (1992)  who used  the change  in the product  composition  of
industrial  exports by area in 1985  and 1990  as a proxy measure  of the extent of the switch in exports by
Poland (and Hungary)  following  the radical  opening  of the economy  in January 1990. The composition  of
26  For a coacise  discussion  of the major  problems  involved,  see Chapter  2 in Economic  Bulletn  fio
Europe Vol. 42/90,  pp. 29-31.22
CEE-5  exports  to the CMEA  and to the  OECD  was  traditionally  strongly  dissimilar,  the former  having  a large
component  of capital  equipment  and electrical  engineering  equipment,  with the latter  being  dominated  by raw
materials  and energy. Rodrick  concludes  that "...  there is no evidence  that the overall increase  in trade with
the West was fueled  by redirecting  Eastern  sales to the West,  or indeed  that the latter played  any role at all
in the former"  (Rodrick,  1992:18).
While some developments  in 1991,  after the switch to convertible  settlements  in the former  intra-
CMEA  trade, seem  to support  Rodrick's  conclusion,  a different  picture  emerges  when  taldng 1985  as a frame
of reference  and focusing  on the electdcal  engineering  industry. For example,  in support  of Rodrick,  in 1991,
as compared  with 1990, the product composition  of Polish exports to former CMEA countries  became
significantly  more similar to the product composition  of its exports to other destinations.'  Faced with
convertible  currency  constraints  after the termination  of the TR-payments  mechanism,  importers  from the
former CMEA  slashed  soft goods in favor of hard goods,  independently  of their origin.  Indicative  of this
switch  was the increase  in imports  of the same  products  which  had been  successfully  marketed  in the OECD
by Polish firms.
Comparison  of Polish industrial  exports to the CMEA  and the EC in 1985 and 1991, however,
-gests that the industrial  product  structure  of exports to the EC shifted  towards  that of the CMW  For
instance, the share in Polish  exports of the electrical  engineering  sector almost  doubled,  from 11.3 percent
in 1985  to 22 percent,  as its exports (in current prices)  to the EC increased  almost  five-fold,  while  its share
of exports  to the CMEA  fell from 63.8  percent  to 45.3 percent. Products  of the electrical  engineering  sector-
machine tools, heating and cooling equipmew, mechanical  handling equipment, etc. 28--were among
manufactures  which  contributed  most to the export  expansion  in the EC.  Without  a detailed  analysis  at the
micro-level,  it is impossible  to tell whether  the SOEs  dominant  in TR trade were also those who managed  to
increase  exports  to other markets.
The redirection  of exports of power generating  equipment  from the CMEA to the EC is illustated
in Table 10.  Power generating  equipment,  the main product  category  of the electrical  engineering  sector,
accounted  for a significant  share of Hungarian  and Polish industrial  exports  to the FSU.  (Exports  to other
CMEA  countries  are not taken  into  account  because  the share of "hard  for soft goods' tansactions was much
27  Tle index  of dimqaty between  the two stuctures (which  asumes I for fill dmilarity  and 0 for
complete  dissimilaity)  rose  from  0.715  in 1990  to 0.896  in 1991. The  index  for 1991  was  calculated  for te  same
breakdown  used  by Rodrick  (1992:18  and 46). In addition,  I calculated  the index  of similarity  betwee product
compositions  of exports  to the  former  European  CMEA  and the  ECE:  the index  rose from  0.621  in 1990  to 0.819
in 1991. For a more  detailed  analysis,  see Kaminski  (1993).
2S  For an extensive  discussion,  see Ksminsli  (1993).23
smaller in their mutual trade than in their trade with the FSU.)  The change in export patterns of the two
countries displays some similarities: Hungarian exports to the FSU peaked in  1987, while Polish exports
peaked in 1988; in the 1985-91 period the value of Hungarian exports to the EC increased almost five times,
while Polish exports increased almost 3.5 times; the largest increase in Hungary's and Poland's exports to the
EC, which occurred in 1990, coincided  with the largest fall in exports to the FSU (the EC absorbed 57 percent
of the fail in Hungarian exports to the FSU and 106 percent of the fall ir  Polish exports to the FSU); as a
result, the ratio of Hungaian  exports to the FSU to exports to the EC fell precipitously from 7.3 in 1985 to
0.41 in 1991, while tho ratio for Poland decreased from 7.0 in 1985 to 0.38.
The degree of redirection of Hungarian and Polish exports of power generating equipment from the
CMEA to the EC may be inferred from two indexes: first,  the ratio of the increase in the value of exports
to the EC to the decrease in the value of exports to the FSU between the peak year of exports to the FSU and
1991; second, the ratio of the total annual changes in the value of exports to the two partners in the 1985-91
period.  These ratios are: 49 and 66 percent for Hungary; and, 33 and 45 percent for Poland.  They suggest
that the scope of redirection was larger for Hungary (between one half and two thirds of the fall in FSU
imports compensated by the increase in EC imports) than for Poland (between one third and close to one half).
These measures should be ti  d with extreme caution, however, because of the use of different implicit
crossrates between the TR and the US doiar  in the period under consideration."  For instance, in 1990 the
crossrates used in both Hungary and Poland significantly  increased, thus depressing the dollar value of exports
to the FSU.  Thus, the value of earlier exports to the FSU was probably oversated,  and so was the contaction
in 1990.  As a result, the scope of redirection of Hungarian and Polish exports of power generating equipment
to the EC might have been actually larger than indicated by these two measures."
This "transformation" of soft goods into hard goods was possible thanks to EC demand (which could
not be met earlier because of obligations vis-a-vis the CMEA partners), greater concern for quality control,
low wages, subsidies (as OECD producers often complains'), or a  combination of the above.2 But the
29 For an extensive  discussion  of statistical  problems  involved,  see Economic  Bulletin  for Europe, Vol  43,
pp.59-62.
30 While no data are available  in the UN COMTRADE  data base for Czecho-Slovalda,  mirror sistics
show a very considerable  increase  in exports of SITC.Rev 1.71 to the EC from US$167  million  in 1989  to US$396
million in 1991. It is clear that reorientation  played an important  role in the increase.
31  West European producers of steel are particularly vocal in criticizing CEE-5 steel makers for
undercutting  prices through subsidies  (Ostry, 1993:12). Clearly, energy-intensive  exports  were subsidized  through
cental  co=iiols  over prices of oil and electricity  in 1990. In 1991 this was not the case, however.24
experience  of the former east Germany's  exports  suggests  that among  these factors low wages  are crucial.
Although  east  Oerman  industry  was regarded  as the most  technologically  sophisticated  within  the CMEA, no
redirection  of exports has so far occurred  despite  the generous  export auarantees  provided  by the Gennan
govermment.  Total exports  contracted  In 1991  by 53 percent  and had it not been  for export  guarantees  to the
FSU, the decline  would  have been much  more  sigDificant.33  This situation  can be attributed  mainly to loss
of competitiveness  triggered  by large increases  in east German  wages (in 1991  they were around 70 percent
of the Westem  level). As Dornbusch  and Wolf (1992:239)  observe:  "The  eastern  German  productivity  level
resembles  Mexico's  or Korea's, while  the  wage level  matches  that of the United  States  and is ten times  greater
than that of the neighboring  Czech  and Slovak  Federal  Republic.  "  A competitive  disadvantage,  the result
of much  lower productivity  in east German  industries  and much  higher  unit wage costs, could  not be ofriset
by quality  advantages. 3 '
Table 9:  ChOni,n  Orientation  of  Hunarian  mid  Potish  Experts  of  Poier  6fnlettfng
Equit  Exports  (SITC. 71) frm  the  FSU  to  the EC  betwsam
1985 and 1991 (mittion  USS)
Hwugary  Poland
Years  FSU  EC  Subtotal  Share of  EC  FSU  EC  Subtotat  Share of  EC
(In  percent)  (in  percent)
1985  518  71  589  12  759  108  864  12
1986  500  100  600  17  619  120  740  16
1987  549  121  670  18  559  154  713  22
1988  468  154  622  25  722  194  916  21
1989  434  176  609  29  653  235  888  26
1990  294  257  550  47  524  370  894  41
1991  133  325  458  71  147  386  533  73
Source:  The  United  Nations  CO4TRADE  data  base, as reported  by Hungary and Poland.
Thus,  one may  conclude  that the troika  export  expansion  was to some  extent  propelled  by redirecdon
of sales from the CMEA  to the EC.3 5 The improvement  in competitiveness  may be precarious,  however.
The loss of momentum  in Polish exports of electrical  engineering  products in  1991 may indicate that
32 One  caveat  should  be made:  without  a detailed  analysis  at the  firms  level,  it is also impossible  to asss
waiether  exports  diverted  from the FSU were profitable  or represented  'distress sales," i.e., at prices below
production  costs.
3 See Focus  Germany,  Deutsche  Bank  Research,  March 1992
34 According  to the  Institute  for Economic  Research  in Halle,  the unit  wage  cost  was  around  70 percent
higher than in west Germany. As the authors  of a report  emphasize,  this situation  is hurting  east German
w"mpetitiveness  because  it is not '...  neutralized  with quality  advantages'  (Pocus  Germanv.  Deutsche  Bank
Research,  March  1992:4).
35 Richter  (1992)  draws  a similar  conclusion  from  the analysis  of change  in Hungarian  trade  patterns.25
improvement  was partly due to  subsidized  energy prices in  1990.  An enterprise-level  assessment  of
redirection  of trade would  shed some  light  on the  potential  for export  growth  in the near future. The available
evidence  indicates  that enterprises  which had specialized  solely in exports to the FSU and other CMEA
countries  did not have much  success  in redirecting  their exports to other markets. For instance,  the driving
force  behind  Poland's  export  expansion  in 1990  were the SOEs  which  had earlier  exposure  to Western  clients
and whose  previous involvement  in intra-CMEA  trade was not significant,  as a recent World Bank study
forcefully  argues (Mueller,  1991).
C.  Im;act of the Switch  from a Supply-  to a Demand-Constrained  Economy
The analysis  in Sections  III and IV of this study shows the dramatic difference  in foreign  trade
performance  between  the most reformed  Central  European  troika  and the BaLlan  countries. It suggests  that
countries  which decontrolled  prices  as well  as liberalizing  their trade regime, bringing  exchange  rates closer
to market-based  levels,  and introducing  unified  exchange  rates, succeeded  in increasing  exports  to the OECD.
No matter  how  liberal  the trade regime  or how  strong  or weak  the domestic  currency,  improvement  in export
performance  was the result of a shift from administrative  rationing to market clearing  prices--i.e., to the
transition  from a supply-  to a demand-constrained  economy. Despite  the liberalization  of the..  .-eign  trade
regimes,  Bulgaria  and Romania  were crippled  by macroeconomic  chaos  and wavering  microeconomic  reforms
and registered  falls  in exports.
By the end of 1991,  external  trade regimes  had been dramatically  liberalized  in CEE-3  countries.'
They  had all adopted  currency  convertibility,  following  a similar set of steps  including  legalization  (or quasi-
legalization)  of black market activities,  liberalization  of domestic  prices and unification  of exchange  rates.
They  had all introduced  tariffs, rules of customs  valuation  and anti-dumping  procedures  which  were more  or
less compatible  with GATr standards. And in all CEE-3  countries  firms could  decide  what they wanted  to
import  and/or export,  and they had the right to buy foreign  currency  at the official  exchange  rate in order to
import goods  or services  from abroad. As a result, tariffs  and exchange  rates became  effective  trade  policy
instruments. 37  Table 10 summarizes  the institutional  features  of the convertibility  and foreign  trade regimes
of the CEE-3  as at the end of 1991.
36  IroniCally,  the only  products  for which  quantitative  restrions  were initially  maintained  were those
subject  to quotas,  VERs,  etc. imposed  on them  by the  EC, the  United  States  and other  trading  partners  (Rodrick,
1992).
37 Their  impact  on firms'  behavior  may  be weakened  by the  extent  to which  SOEs  operate  under  a soft-
budget  constraint.  This  is still  the case  for many  SOEs  in all post-communist  economies,  especially  for the large
ones  which,  because  of size,  bave  strong  political  clout.26
In the arena of domestic  transformation  policies  the timing  of their launching  and their scope varied
among  the CEE-5. The differences  in institutional  circumstances  in Hungary,  Poland and the FCSK set the
troika apart from Bulgaria  and Romania. 38 Poland  moved  from a supply-  to a demand-wconstrained  economy
in January 1990,  and the FCSK  in January 1991. The  transition  to a market  economy  in Hungary  was more
gradual,  and a specific  date cannot  be given.39  Bulgaria  made significant  strides in this direction  throughout
1991,  while  Romania  was  still in an "institutional  vacuum"  in mid-1992.  The  two Balkan  countries  offer  some
indications  as to the impact  of the loss  of central  macroeconomic  controls  on export  performance  in a shortage
economy:  this inevitably  leads  to the collapse  of exports  no matter  how liberal  a trade regime may  become.4
On the other hand, the impressive  gains made by the FCSK, Hungary and Poland in OECD markets
demonstrated  the strong  link between  radical  economic  reforms  and export  performance.  For the FCSK  and
Poland, the link is striking when the dates of implementing  the economic  transformation  programs are
juxtaposed  with their export  growth  statistics. During  the first year of the transformation  programs,  Poland
increased  its exports to the OECD  by 43 percent  and the FCSK  by 37 percent.
Tlhe  major  domestic  changes  which  encouraged  exports  on the basis  of comparative  advantage  for the
CEE-3  countries  included  the contraction  in domestic  economic  activities  as a result of restrictive  monetary
and fiscal policies, th  :3exaliztion  of prices, and the granting  of significant  autonomy  to SOEs.  These
reforms  were undertaken  by the troika  countries  in 1990  and 1991. Another  factor which  had a bearing  on
their export  performance  was earlier commercial  links between  SOEs and the OECD.
Even though all CEE-3 economies  carried out these reforms  in general  terms, differences  of detail
existed. These stemmed  largely from the differences  in economic  conditions  preceding  the collapse  of the
communist regimes.  Hungary, with many market institutions  already in place before the collapse of
communism,  was able to continue  its evolutionary  path; the FCSK, which had a relatively balanced  and
38 Having  gone  through  a different  political  cycle  following  the  collapse  of communist  regimes, Bulgaria
and Romania  began  transforming  their  economic  systems  only in 1991. In both countries,  the first free  elections
held  in 1990  brought  about  the  victory  of former  communist  parties. The  former  communist  party  lost  its majority
in the Bulgarian  parliament  in the second  elections  in the faull  of 1991,  and, as a result,  the reform  process  has
acquired  a greater  degree  of political  credibility.
39  In September  1990  the Hungarian  govemnment  adopted  a three-year  transformation  program,  speling
out the major  measures  that  would  reduce  direct  government  intervention  in the economy,  expand  the role  of the
private  sector,  further  liberalize  prices,  and  provide  a gradual  adjustment  of the  finncial sector  to the  market rules
of the  game.' m
40 This  is not a new  finding.  Neither  is this  phenomenon  currently  limited  to Bulgaria  and  Romnuia.  The
link was amply illustrated  by the Polish  experience  during the Solidarity  period in 1981 (Poland's share in OECD
imports  dropped  by 31.4 percent). The current fall  in the foreign  trade of former Soviet republics  is in part related
to the same phenomenon.27
centralized  economy,  did not need very restrictive  stabilization  policies  (some  would argue that the policies
chosen  were unnecessarily  restrictive,  see Blejer  and Gelb, 1992);  while  Poland,  which suffered  from severe
domestic  imbalances  exacerbated  by the significant  autonomy  given  to SOEs, required  radical stabilization
policies.
Reactions  by CEE-3  firms  to policy  changes  were not expected  to be 'normal" market  reactions,  given
the institutional  fluidity  within  these  countries  and the limited  role of the private sector in the initial  phases
of the transformation  process. Yet the response  to the breakdown  of the state monopoly  of foreign  trade  and
the introduction  of current  account  convertibility  was a dramatic  increase  in the number  of firms involved  in
foreign  trade activity,  a seemingly  normal  reaction. The link between  imports,  domestic  aggregate  demand
and the real exchange  rate, which  barely  existed  under central  planning,  was established  under the economic
transformation  measures. Import  decisions  became  responsive  to price relationships  between  domestic  and
foreign  goods.
However,  some responses  may strike one as perverse, i.e., non-textbook  responses. For instance,
a simple  comparison  of monthly  real exchange  rates with monthly  convertible  currency  exports suggests  that
the appreciation  of the Polish  zloty was not accompanied  by a contraction  of exports in 1990.4 Similarly,
neither  in the  FCSK  noi.'  in Hungary  did the  significant  reciation  of their  currencies  throughout  1991  trigger
a fail in exports. On the contrary,  exports  increased  significantly  at a time of increasing  domestic  costs and
falling  foreign prices. 42 The initially  low sensitivity  of SOE managements  to profit considerations  can be
explained  by the fact that these  pressures  were somewhat  attenuated  by govermnent  subsidies  of SOEs,4 as
well as by expectations  that 'things will soon become ab-normal  again."  Also, many SOEs held very
41  A regression  with monthly  convertible  currency  imports  as the dependent  vanable  and aggregate
expenditures  and  the  real  exchange  rate  as independent  variables  (accounting  for a seasonal  variation)  for the 1988-
89 and 1990-91  periods  yields  the  following  results:  weak  relationships  between  imports  and the  real exchange  rate
and domestic  expenditures  for the period  before  the 'big bang' of 1990,  and strong  ones  for the 1990-91  period
(Michalek,  1992).
42 Although  all CEE-3  govemments  devalued  their  domestic  currencies  in 1990  and 1991,  the  devaluations
tended  to be less than  the inflation  rates,  thus  leading  to a revaluation  in real terms. The 'big bangs' in Czecho-
Slovakia  and  Poland  were  accompanied  by  a significant  depreciation  in the  real  exchange  rates,  subsequently  eroded
by inflation.  The  devaluation-inflation  gap was  particularly  acute  in Poland  throughout  most  of 1990  and  until  May
1991  (Winiecki,  1991),  and in Hungary  in 1991  (Denton,  1992). The gap was much  less severe  in Czecho-
Slovakia,where  monthly  inflation  rates  peaked  in early  1991  (Rodrick,  1992).
43  The  degree  and modes  of subsidization  varied  across  countries. But  during  the initial  stage  of the
transformation,  they all had one thing  in common,  namely,  since  most  state-controLled  prices  were below  world
market  levels,  export  of these  products  or of products  with  a high content  of mnputs  subject  to price controls  was
in fa-t -absidized. This  was the  case  for exports  of energy-intensive  goods.28
significant  stocks  of raw materials  and intermediate  products," they had accumulated  stocks  of convertible
currencies  under the export  earnings  retention  scheme  (used  in Bulgaria  and Poland),  and they  had easy access
to credits and subsidies. Under  these circumstances,  the restraints  on money  supply  affected  the liquidity
position  of households  and private firmse 5 but not that of SOEs cushioned  by the "old" system.  Another
consideration  is that the dwindling  domestic  demand  might  have pushed  some SOEs  to engage  in discounting
prices below full production  costs.  These 'distress sales," also experienced  by private firms in market
economies  during an economic  downturn,  may have contributed  to the weaker sensitivity  of SOEs to the
exchange  rate policy.
It is impossible  to link  specific  policy  variables  with export  performance  in the circumstances  peculiar
to each country. There are too many  variables,  and they were Ph"mging  too rapidly  throughout  the 1990-91
period. Yet two broad sets of circumstances  were shared bv exporters  in the CEE-3. First, the shift to a
demand-constrained  economy  was  accompanied  by a fall  in aggregate  output  and domestic  demand. We  have
no reliable  data  on the developments  in domestic  absorption,  but the  downturn  in domestic  demand  as proxied
by the Net Material  Product  (NMP)  and industrial  output  was quite significant. During  the first year of the
transformation  program  in the FCSK, the NMP fell by 20 percent and industrial  output  by 23 percent.  In
Hungary, the NMP was 11 percent lower and in Poland 23 percent lower in  1  than in 1989, while
industrial  output  was 23 percent  and 33 percent  lower, respectively.'
It is interesting  to note  the correlation  between  the contraction  in domestic  aggregate  activity  and the
growth of exports to OECD markets (measured  by the increase in the share of OECD imports).  The
relationship  is somewhat  obscured  by the Czechoslovak  performance:  the FCSK's increase  in OECD  import
share in 1991  was smaller  than Poland's, but the fatl in industrial  output  and national  income  during  the first
year of the transition  program  (by 16 percent  and 22 percent,  respectively)  was slightly  larger  then in Poland
(13 percent and 23 percent, respectively).  This slight  difference  between  the Polish  and Czechoslovak  cases
might  have  been  due to several  factors:  the above-mentioned  alleged  macroeconomic  overkill  at the outset  of
the transformation  program  in the FCSK;  greater dependence  of the FCSK  on trade with the FSU; and
"  Because  of the  unreliability  of supplies  and  persistent  excess  demand  for their  products,  the  SOEs  tended
to maintain  high inventories  of inputs  rather  than  of finished  products. For an extensive  analysis,  see Kaminsi
(l991:Ch.2).
45  A comparison  of real changes  in households'  and SOEs'  deposits  suggests  that this was the case  in
Poland  in 1990. It may  be worth  adding  that  this situation  continued  in 1991  (for more  discussion  on this point,
see Winiecki,  1990:765-790).
46 See  Tables  3.2.3 and 3.2.6 in UN, ECE 1992.29
Tabte 10:  A Sumry  of  Convertibility  and Foreign  Trade Regimes  in the  CEE-3  (end of  1991)
Institution  Exchange  Pegged  Access to  Convertible  Export  Tariffs  Licensing & Irport responsible  Rate  Currency  Currency Markets  Measures  Quotas
for  setting  Regime
exchange rate
Czechoslovakia
Council  of  Fixed  Currency  Purchase unlimited.  No taxes and subsidies.  Average around  No  quantitative Ministers.  basket  (DM  Firms can buy CC  Around 201  of  exports  51.  A tenporary  controls.  Feu National  Bank  accounts for  in  banks.  subject  to  lIcersing  import  surcharge  import  Licenses sets  the  45.5X)  Individuals  (covers  weapons, essen-  of  151.  Around  covering  weapons, exchange rate  entitled  to  tial  inputs  and VERs).  96X is  GATT-  drugs,  etc. within  +/-10X  S175 per year.  bound.
of  the  official
rate.
Hungsr
Planning  Crawling  Currency  Purchase  unlimited.  Subsidies  on some  Average  around  Licenses  cover Committee  of  basket  Firms  can buy  CC in  agricultural  products.  13X.  but  other  around  101  of
Council  of  (50  USS,  banks  for  foreign  Restrictions  related  charges  (5-6X  total  imports.
Ministers.  501  ECU)  trade  transactions.  to  OECD  nontariff  ad  valorem).  1001 advance
National  Bank  Individuals  entitled  restrictions.  ifport  deposit sets  the  to  S50 per  year.  required.
exchange  rate
withfn+/-S5
of  the  central
rate.
. . . .......................  . ....  ....  ..  ..  ..  ..  . .............  ..  . ...  ....  ..  ...  .....  ....  . .......  ......................
Poland
Council  of  Downward  Currency  Full  convertibility  No taxes  and subsidies.  Average  around  No restric-
of  Ministers  crawl  basket  for  current  account  Export  quotas  related  14X.  All  procedu-  tions  except
(pre-  transactions.  to  OECD  restrictions  res  in  line  with  for  alcoholic
announced)  and selected  inputs.  GATT  articles.  beverages.
Sources:  Jan  J.  Michalek,  The  Opening-Up  of  the  Polish  Economy, PPRG  Discussion  Paper #11,  University  of  Warsaw,  December 1991;  Dani  Rodrick,
Foreign  Trade  in  Eastern  Europess  Transition:  Early  Results,  NBER, mimeo, January  1992;  and Gazeta  Bankowa, No.  44,  11.03-11.09.1991.30
initialy, the less-developed  commercial  links of Czechoslovak  SOFs  with OECD  importers. (The  last factor
was due to the stringent  monopoly  of foreign  trade in the FCSK in the 1980s,  see Section  11). Hungary,
which adopted the most cautious  approach, experienced  the lowest decline in GDP, and had the lowest
increase in OECD  market share among  the CEE-3. These  relationships  between  export expansion  and the
contraction  in aggregate  economic  activity  point  to the domestic  demand  slump  as an important  determinant
of export  performance.
The second  set of circumstances  shared  by the CEE-3  economies  was  that the emergence  of a domestic
demand  constraint  combined  with the liberalization  of trading regimes  created an environment  where the
incentives  to export were strong.  Faced with the collapse  of consumer  demand and devaluation,  export
expansion  became  one of the few options  available  for preventing  too drastic  a fall In output. Because  of the
cessation  of the CMEA  soft payments  mechanism,  the insolvency  of Soviet  importers,  and the faU  in import
demand  in the former CMEA  economies,  the only avenue  was to expand  exports  to markets  other than the
FSU and the  CMEA. Surprisingly,  given  the  dominance  of SOEs  and the  obsolete  capital  stocks  in the CEE-5
economies,  SOEs from the most reformed  CEE-3  economies  responded  to these challenges,  showing  very
impressive  export performance. Enterprises  with established  links with OECD importers  and marketing
expertise  were clearly  in a better position  to  advantage  of this situation.
The primary  force  behind  the impressive  export  performance  of the CEE-3  was the restructuring  of
their domestic  economic  systems  involving  the liberalization  of prices  and the  hardening  of budget  constraints
for SOEs.  The reforms  made  the SOEs  more responsive  to market  signals. By establishing  more  trnsprn
links between  their  performance  and their  financial  situation,  the  reform  measures  subjected  SOEs  to a tighter
budget  constraint. At the same  time, the significant  liberalization  in trade  policy  exposed  the SOEs  to foreign
competition. As the experience  of different CEE-5 economies  demonstates (see section II), however,
liberalization  of the foreign  trade regime has no significant  impact  on export performance  if the economy
remains  a supply-constrained  economy,  that is, if the shift to market-clearing  prices is not made. In fact, the
experience  of Bulgaria  and Romania  in the 1990-91  period shows  that a hybrid of quasi-markets  and quasi-
administrative  controls  has a disastrous  impact  on export  performance. Thus the key to improved  export
performance  is the shift to a demand-constrained  economy  accompanied  by liberalization  of the foreign  trade
regime.
VI.  IS THE EXPORT  EXPANSION  TO THE OECD  SUSTAINABLE?
There are still too many unknowns  to be able to give an unequivocal  assessment  of whether  the
improved  export  performance  experienced  in the first year of the transformation  programs  in the FCSK and
Poland is sustainable. Although  the increase  in exports  to OECD  markets  was quite dramatic,  it does not31
necessarily  imply a dramatic  change in the CEE-3  economies'  competitiveness  and export potential. Their
industrial  base, inherited  from central  planning,  has remained  unchanged  and will not be transformed  unless
an upswing  in output  and capital  formation  takes  place. The improvement  in exports  was impressive  but only
against the background  of the dismal performance  in the 1980s.  Still, the export boom, driven by
manufactures,  was  an unexpected  outcome  of the transformation  and represented  a turnound  in CEE-3  export
performance  in OECD  markets.
The argument in support of seeing  the export expansion  as only a temporary  phenomenon  is as
follows. The major constraint  on the trade performance  of the CEE-3  in the 1980s  was on the supply  side.
The removal of this constraint,  by replacing  an administrative  economic  system by a marcet-based  one,
reduced  waste in the use of resources. The fall in consumption  led to a temporary  increase  in export  offers.
The main source of expanded  exports  was not diversion  from former  CMEA  markets  but the contraction  of
domestic  demand,  resulting  in distress  exports. Expansion  of exports  will be possible  only so long as there
is a further compression in domestic demand accompanied by devaluations of domestic currency to ensure
profitability  of exports.
However, there are grounds  for sketching  a more  optimistic  scenario. First, the troika economies
continued  their export  expansion  in 1992. For instance,  during  the first six  iths of 1992, the third year
of the transformation  program, Polish  exports in current prices increased  by 12.5 percent (CPO, 1992:1),
while the value of Hungarian  exports increased  by 14 percent for the first seven months  of 1992"  More
significantly,  the increase  in Polish exports took place against  a background  of stagnant  (not contacting)
domestic  demand.
Second,  the export  upswing  took place in an institutional  environment  whose  full export  potential  is
yet  to be tapped. Two institutional  constraints  remain. The first relates  to the dominance  of the state-owned
sector. During  the initial  stage of the transformation,  the export  push came from SOEs with organizational
structures inherited from central planning.  Privatization  of SOEs, usually preceded by organizational
restructuring  to make state-owned  assets more attractive  to potential  investors, is likely to increase their
capacity  to compete  in international  markets.
The second  institutional  constraint  to export  growth  relates  to the absence  of organizations  providing
information  and credits  for export-oriented  activities. While the absence  of export-promoting  infrastructure
was not particularly  relevant  for large SOEs with an earlier presence  in OECD markets, it may hamper
exports  by newly-established  private firms.  The problem  is that they are usually small and seldom  have
information  capabilities  for identifying  export  opportunities. In addition,  since they lack capital, they tend
47  See Transition.  The Newsletter  about  Reforming  Economies,  The World Bank, Vol. 3, No. 8,
September  1992,  p. 11.32
to  trade with geographically  close countries, as the experience  of small Hungarian  and Polish fims
illustrates."' Their share in exports, though  increasing,  remains  lower than their share in aggregate  output.
In brief,  privatization  and organizational  restructuring  of SOEs  together  with  the development  of infrastructure
facilitadng  access  to foreign  markets  may provide  strong  stimuli  to exports.
More  mesearch  is needed on the following  issues to provide an answer to the question of the
sustainability  of export growth  following  the introduction  of radical  transformation  programs:
First, the extent to which SOEs successful  in marketing  their products in the OECD have been
affected  by the decLine  in investment  activity. The evidence  is scarce but there are some indications  that
export-oriented  enterprises  face a fimancial  squeeze,' 9 and that export  performance  has not been reflected  in
higher profitability. If this is so, it is doubtfiul  that export-oriented  SOEs have invested  in upgrading  their
production  capacities,  which will  add to the difficulties  of privatizing  SOEs.
Second,  the supply  side of the export  upswing. Among  the questions  relevant  to the sustainability
issue are: what manufactured  goods  contributed  to the  export  drive  of the CEE-3,  to what extent  did revealed
comparative  advantages  change during the recent export drive, and did exports originate mainly from
productive  capacities  of more recent vintage?
bird, the characteristics  of the major  CEE-3  export  markets,  that is, whether  these  OECD  markle:
are stagnating,  contracting,  or expanding?
Fmially,  the impact of rising foreign direct investment  in the CEE-350  by OECD firms on the
international  competitiveness  of the troika.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper  provides  analysis  to support  the following  findings. Furst,  the decision  to move  quicldy
to a market-based  economy  was closely  linked  with export  performance. This is illustrated  by the dramatic
difference  between  the export performance  of the most reformed Central European  troika and that of the
4s  According  to the Hungarian  Ministry  for International  Economic  Relations,  the growth  of small  and
medium-sized  finns engaged  in exports  was one of the factors  accounting  for the fall in trade with developing
countries  (see 'Hungary:  Foreign  Trade,' Oxford  Analvtica,  27 August  1992). Polish  private  firms  also export
mainly  to EC markets  (see CPO-1992  and MWGZ-1992).
49 For instance,  the  Hungarian  minister  of international  economic  relations,  Bela  Kadar,  noted  that SOEs
facing  bankruptcy  exported  products  worth  around  US$1  billion  in 1991.  See Radio  Free Europe  - Daily  Report,
June  30, 1992. In 1991  the  Polish  staowned industrial  sector  recorded  significant  losses,  but it is unclear  whether
the SOEs  heavily  involved  in exports  were  profitable.
50  For a statistical  survey  of foreign  investment  in Central  and Eastern  Europe, see East Eurnean
Investment,  June 1992:14-25.33
Balkan countries.  Countries which liberalized their trade regimes, devalued currencies, introduced unified
exchange rates, and removed administrative  controls over prices succeeded in increasing  exports to the OECD.
Roimania,  crippled by macroeconomic chaos and vacillating microeconomic reforms, registered falls in both
exports and imports.
Second,  developments in  export performance  following the  implementation of  comprehensive
transformation programs seem to have had little to do with previous trends in export performance, external
economic factors and earlier attempts at trade regime reforms.  Pre-transformation  export performance  offered
no clues as to what actually occurred--the export expansion in the 1990-92  period was a dramatic reversal of
trends prevailing over the previous two decades.  Similarly, the degree to which the administrative economic
system was modified before the collapse of communism turned out to be of less consequence for foreign trade
than was generally anticipated.  The FCSK, which was not at the forefront of reform efforts under centrai
planning and had  not sought to expand commercial relations with the OECD, recorded export growth as
impressive as Poland's.  Thus, neither the length of the "adjustment period" to market institutions and less
rigidly controlled foreign trade nor earlier trends in compe'titiveness  in OECD markets explain the increase
in exports.
Third, the differences an,. ng the troika in export growth to the OECD were positively correlated with
the  size of contractioD  in GDP rather than with exchange rate policies.  Hungary experienced the lowest
decline in GDP, but simultaneously  experienced the lowest increase in OECD market share among the CEE-3.
The devaluation-inflation  gap in the CEE-3 had no significant impact on exports. The domestic demand  slump
associated with the transformation was the most important determinant of export performance.
Fourth, the severance of links that used to bind economies of the CMEA had a less destructive impact
on foreign trade performance than onia  might expect.  Although relationships between intra-CMEA trade and
trade with the OECD are still obscure, the simultaneity of the fall in exports to the CMEA and the increase
in exports to the West suggests a connection. These developm_nts  give an interesting twist to East Europeans'
description of the CMEA as a "council for mutual exchange of inefficiencies."34
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STATISTICAL  WFPEIDIX
Appendix Table 1:  Suwmry Characteristics  of  the  Export Performance  of  the CEE-5  in  the OECD  in  1983-89 and 1990-91.
Rates of  Export  Average  Share in OECD  Index of  CEE-5  Ratio of  CEE-5  Commodity  Coqposition of  Country Shares in Growth to  OECD  Imports  Exports  to  OECD  Export Index to  CEE-5  Exports  X Change  Total  CEE-5  Exports X Change Iworts  (value)  OEC)  Imaort Index  Average in  in Share  Average  Change  In In  Share  1989  1991  1989  1991  share 1990  1991  '84-89  '90-91  (d/c-I)  '83=100 '89=100  '83-100  '89=100)  '84-89  '90-91  CiIh-1)  '84-89  '90-91  (nl/mI) (a)  (b)  (c)  (d)  (e)  (f)  (g)  (h)  Ci)  (j)  (k)  (l)  (m)  Cn)  (o)
CEE-5
Total  Exports  19  16  0.95  0.97  2  169  137  93  115  100  100  ---  ---  ---  --- Foeds  and  Feeds  18  6  1.41  1.63  16  192  126  121  102  15  16  6  ---  ---  --- Mireral  Fuels  -12  -14  1.44  0.84  -CI  99  75  130  60  20  9  -54  ...  ...  ... Ores and  Non-Ferrous  8  20  1.33  1.52  14  196  129  107  139  6  6  2  ...  ...  --- Raw  Materiats  10  -6  1.67  1.54  -7  150  104  84  110  6  5  -23 Manufactures  29  25  0.74  0.86  16  197  161  85  134  51  62  22  ---  ---  ...
gulgaria
Total  Exports  22  6  0.04  0.04  -5  129  71  109  100  100  ---  4  4  -6 Foods  and  Feeds  25  12  0.11  0.13  17  145  .40  91  114  27  31  15  8  8  1 Minerat  Fuels  -26  -79  0.05  0.01  -72  46  154  61  12  15  4  -77  3  1  -54 Ores and Non-Ferrous  9  100  0.04  0.05  40  151  218  83  235  4  5  29  3  3  19 Raw  Materials  -10  -16  0.05  0.05  0  249  76  140  80  5  4  -13  3  4  6 Manufactures  37  9  0.03  0.03  4  159  149  69  123  47  55  18  4  4  -10
Czechoslovakia
Total Exports  17  37  0.20  0.22  14  157  160  86  134  100  100  ---  21  23  11 Foods  and  Feeds  9  9  0.15  0.18  16  192  119  121  97  8  8  -3  11  11  1 Mineral  Fuels  -14  -6  0.19  0.14  -28  95  81  125  64  13  7  -48  13  16  23 Ores  and  Non-Ferrous  -1  120  0.13  0.22  68  195  216  107  232  3  4  28  10  14  6 Raw  Materials  3  -22  0.65  0.52  -20  146  80  82  85  12  7  -38  39  33  -14 Manufactures  27  49  0.19  0.23  22  170  188  74  156  64  73  15  26  27  438
Appendix Table 1 (cont.):  Summary  Characteristics  of  the  Export  Performance  of  the CEE-5  in  the  OECD  in  1983-89  and 1990-91
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